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Soviet Joint Venture Model
ABSTRACT
This study employs the method of transaction-cost 
analysis - the price of doing business between economic and 
political agents - to the study of Soviet-Western political 
economy (particularly Soviet joint ventures with the West). 
Its purpose is to determine: (1) if Soviet foreign
economic policy in the Gorbachev era has reduced the 
transaction costs to Western firms engaging in joint 
ventures with the Soviet Union when compared to previous 
Western business options (e.g., co-production, licensing, 
turn-key projects), and (2) if the reduction is sufficient 
to encourage joint ventures to become a mechanism of 
greater cooperation and liberalization in Soviet-Western 
political economy and the international political economy 
(IPE).
Survey data collected from 518 Western firms doing 
business in the Soviet Union supports the theoretical 
assumptions of the transaction-cost literature. Empirical 
analyis of the data demonstrates that the decision by a 
Western firm to engage or not engage in a joint venture is 
directly influenced by that firm's perception of the level 
of transaction costs that would be incurred in such a 
venture. The study demonstrates that transaction-cost 
analysis provides greater empirical verisimilitude than any 
other existing IPE model for the study of Soviet-Western 
political economy.
vii
CHAPTER ONE
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF SOVIET-WESTERN POLITICAL ECONOMY?
By his own admission, Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev acknowledges that the Stalinist extensive 
economic model has outlived its usefulness in the Soviet 
Union. Totalitarian taut planning, Gorbachev says, may 
have hastened industrialization in the 1930s and 
mobilization in the 1940s, but has become the "braking 
mechanism" of the Soviet economy in the postwar era of 
global interdependence and technological change (Gorbachev 
1987:47). The Soviet economy, which grew at an annual 10 
percent rate in the 1950s, has slowed to approximately a 
one percent annual growth rate in 1989 (Tedstrom 1990:2).
In an effort to halt and reverse this economic slowdown, 
Gorbachev has embarked upon a program that calls for the 
restructuring of existing institutions, investment 
priorities, labor incentives, prices, and foreign trade 
practices in the Soviet Union. The reason for the radical 
restructuring program is simple: the Soviet economic
slowdown has placed the Soviet Union at the risk of being 
permanently cast as a second-rate economic and political 
power or what Jan Winecki (1989) calls a Permanently 
Developing Country (PDC) in the international system. A 
concerted effort to reform the domestic economy of the 
Soviet Union and improve its economic and political 
relations with the West is in order to avoid the PDC label.
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In September 1986, Gorbachev introduced legislation
that reorganized the foreign trade structure of the Soviet
Union with the goal of facilitating greater Soviet-Western
economic cooperation. After a year in which the pace of
reform in the Soviet foreign trade system failed to meet
Gorbachev's expectations, the foreign trade bureaucracy was
reorganized and new legislation was issued with the hope of
strengthening Soviet economic ties with the West. In
January 1987, after a period of approximately 60 years
during which Western firms were prohibited from owning an
equity interest in domestic Soviet firms, the Soviet Union
issued an edict entitled "On the Procedures Governing the
Creation, on USSR Territory, and the Activities of Joint
Enterprises with the Participation of Soviet Organizations
and Firms of Capitalist and Developing Countries" (Foreign
Trade 1987; ICC 1989). The primary objective of the edict
is found in the first paragraph:
The resolution is aimed at further developing trade, 
economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with 
the capitalist, and developing countries on a stable 
and mutually advantageous basis.
This is a timely and important research topic because 
Soviet joint ventures with the West are considered the 
cornerstone of Gorbachev's foreign economic policy as he 
attempts to reorganize the Soviet foreign trade system and 
to integrate the Soviet Union into the international 
political economy (IPE). The study will employ the concept 
of "transaction-cost analysis" —  the price of doing
business between economic and political agents —  to the 
study of Soviet joint ventures with the West to determine:
(1) if Soviet foreign economic policy in the Gorbachev era 
has reduced the transaction costs to Western firms engaging 
in foreign economic relations with the Soviet Union when 
compared to previous Western business options in the Soviet 
Union (e.g., co-production, licensing, turn-key projects), 
and (2) if the reduction is sufficient to encourage joint 
ventures to become a mechanism of greater cooperation and 
liberalization in Soviet-Western economic and political 
relations.
Currently, the literature on economic and political 
cooperation in international trade (including Soviet- 
Western trade issues) in the IPE subfield of international 
politics is found within the context of three dominant 
theories: hegemonic stability theory, regime theory, and
the theory of reciprocal cooperation. The problem with 
approaching Soviet-Western trade from these mainstream IPE 
theoretical frameworks is that they are designed 
specifically for the study of political and economic 
relations between nations with well established, 
functioning free market economies. Attempting to apply 
only these theories to Soviet-Western economic and 
political relations is somewhat problematic because the 
Soviet Union has yet to establish a functioning free market 
economy. In an effort to overcome the deficiencies of
these theories in explaining Soviet-Western economic and 
political relations exclusively within the context of the 
existing IPE theories, this study attempts to integrate a 
relatively new theoretical framework to bear on the problem 
of Soviet-Western trade to determine if Soviet joint 
ventures have the potential to significantly effect Soviet- 
Western economic and political relations. Efforts to 
provide an analytic and systematic explanation of Soviet 
foreign economic policy and its impact on Soviet-Western 
economic and political relations have become increasingly 
important as major changes regularly occur in the 
international system that make the IPE more competitive and 
interdependent. Transaction-cost analysis provides the 
basis for not only examining the amount of overall trade 
between the Soviet Union and the West in joint venture 
arrangements, but can also explain the nature and impact of 
these trading relationships.
The transaction-cost analysis developed in this study 
will refine and expand the transaction-cost frameworks 
currently employed in the study of international politics 
and economics. The basic foundation for transaction-cost 
analysis in the study of international politics is found 
within the political economy literature, particularly 
literature on international regimes (see Baldwin 1985; 
Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1988; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 
1987a and 1987b). In the field of economics, transaction-
cost economics is a product of the subfield known as 
"institutional economics" or the "new economics of 
organization" (NEO), which is based on the work of such 
economists as Ronald Coase (1960), John Commons (1950), 
Geoffrey Hodgson (1988), and Oliver Williamson (1985 and 
1986). However, Robert Keohane argues that transaction- 
cost analysis is "not a substitute for a power-oriented or 
interdependence position (a.k.a., international politics), 
but is rather a supplement to these "traditional modes of 
political analysis" (Keohane 1990:746).
This study will offer a description of NEO and 
transaction-cost analysis and an examination of their 
theoretical connection and importance to international 
politics and Soviet-Western political economy. The primary 
purpose of this study, however, is to conduct empirical 
tests using survey data to determine if the decision by 
Western firms to engage in Soviet joint ventures is the 
direct or indirect result of the reduction of the 
transaction costs involved in Soviet-Western political 
economy brought about by the implementation of the Soviet 
joint venture law, and if the reduction is sufficient to 
encourage joint ventures to become a mechanism of greater 
cooperation in Soviet-Western political economy.
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter Two
examines the game theoretic context of international trade. 
Because international trade is widely assumed to have the 
payoff structure of a prisoner's dilemma, that concept is 
briefly reviewed and analyzed as applied to international 
trade. Chapter Two also examines the different factors 
postulated as causing the prisoner's dilemma dimension of 
international trade. This chapter identifies different 
factors associated with the two major paradigms of IPE, 
neorealism and pluralism, and their application to Soviet- 
Western trade. In addition to identifying the different 
obstacles emphasized by neorealism and pluralism, this 
chapter also presents an overview of each paradigm and 
examines the three dominant theories of international trade 
found in the IPE literature: hegemonic stability theory,
regime theory, and the theory of reciprocal cooperation.
The primary objective of this chapter is to demonstrate 
that the problem with approaching Soviet-Western trade 
exclusively from these mainstream IPE theoretical 
frameworks is that they are designed specifically for the 
study of political and economic cooperation between nations 
with established, functioning free market economies.
Chapter Three examines NEO and transaction-cost 
analysis. In this chapter, the conceptual framework of 
transaction-cost analysis is placed within the context of 
the international politics literature examined in Chapter
Two and the framework is applied to the problem of Soviet- 
Western trade within the context of the IPE. Chapter Three 
also offers a descriptive analysis of the primary 
transaction costs of Soviet-Western political economy, 
which provides the basis for an analysis of Soviet joint 
ventures with the West.
Chapter Four begins by developing a model of Soviet 
joint ventures with the West that permits a test to 
determine whether transaction costs directly or indirectly 
affect Western business firms* decision to engage or not 
engage in a joint venture project in the USSR. The data 
for this study come from a survey of both Western firms 
engaged in Soviet joint ventures and Western firms not 
engaged in Soviet joint ventures but who are conducting 
other business arrangements with the Soviet Union. The 
survey information was compiled and coded into a data set 
in order to test the following model and research 
hypothesis (see Figure 1):
Model: SJV = a + b^TAC) + b2 (INTBUS) + b3 (SOVPOL)
+ b4(WESTPOL) + b5(SOP) + e
SJV: The Western firm's decision to engage or not
engage in a joint venture in the Soviet 
Union.
TAC: The Western firm's perception of the level
of transaction costs that may be incurred 
by engaging in a Soviet joint venture.
INTBUS: The Western firm's perception of the level
of business and strategic planning risks 
involved in engaging or not engaging in 
a Soviet joint venture.
SOVPOL: The Western firm's perception of the Soviet
political climate.
SOP: The Western firm's perception of the impact
of Soviet government policy on their 
decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet 
joint venture.
WESTPOL: The Western firm's perception of the impact
of Western government policy on their 
decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet 
joint venture.
Research Hypothesis: The decision by Western firms to
engage in Soviet joint ventures is the direct or
indirect result of the reduction of the transaction 
costs involved in Soviet-Western political economy.
In order to test both the relative contribution of the
variables introduced above and their predictive power in a
multivariate context, logistic regression will be employed
with the decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet joint
venture (SJV) as the dependent variable and TAC, INTBUS,
SOVPOL, SOP, and WESTPOL as the independent variables.
There are a few notable similarities between formal
procedures, goals, and interpretations in logistic
regression and analysis employing the "classic" regression
model (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989:1-24, but when a dependent
variable is dichotomous (e.g., SJV), logistic regression
analysis is preferred. The use of the classical regression
model in such instances may lead to:
. . . serious misestimate(s) in the magnitude of the
effects of the independent variables . . . all of the 
standard statistical inferences such as hypotheses 
tests or the construction of confidence intervals are 
unjustified and the regression estimates will be 
highly sensitive to the range of particular values
observed for the independent variables - thus making 
extrapolations or forecasts beyond the range of the 
data especially unjustified (Aldrich and Nelson 
1984:9-10).
The goal of an analysis employing logistic regression 
is the same as that of any model building technique used in 
statistics: "to find the best fitting and most
parsimonious model to describe the relationship between the 
dependent (outcome) variable and a set of independent 
(predictor or explanatory) variables" (Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1989:1). Since SJV is a dichotomous dependent variable and 
the goal of the study is an understanding of the dynamics 
involved in the decision by a Western firm to engage or not 
engage in a Soviet joint venture, logistic regression is 
appropriate for an investigation of this nature.
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a 
"new world order," the study of Soviet-Western political 
economy is found to be theoretically lacking. This study 
attempts to overcome the void by providing new theoretical 
and empirical insights on one specific aspect of Soviet- 
Western political economy: Soviet joint ventures with the
West.
Figure 1 
Soviet Joint V entures Model
WESTPO
TA
SOP SJV
INTBU
SOVPOL
H
O
11
JOINT VENTURES IN THE CHANGING SOVIET POLITICAL ECONOMY
When this study began the Soviet Union under 
the leadership of President Mikhail Gorbachev appeared to 
be moving toward a free market economy and complete 
integration of the Soviet Union into the international 
political economy (IPE). However, by the summer of 1990 
numerous events transpired in the Soviet Union that 
appeared to change the direction of Gorbachev's program of 
perestroika, which, inturn, raised questions about the 
relevance of this study and the future of Soviet joint 
ventures. This section will briefly recount some of these 
events and demonstrate that the results of this study and 
transaction-cost analysis are still valid despite the 
current Soviet political and social climate.
In July 1990, President Mikhail Gorbachev engaged in 
negotiations with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian 
Republic, on the Shatalin Plan. The Shatalin Plan was a 
500 day economic program to transform the
stagnant/declining Soviet command economy to a free market 
by selling off all state enterprises (e.g., factories and 
farms), letting prices reflect relative scarcity through 
supply and demand, promoting private enterprise, and 
facilitating the "devolution of power to the republics in 
exchange for their participation in a kind of economic 
commonwealth" (New York Times. February 3, 1991). However, 
following a brief vacation, Gorbachev returned to Moscow
offering a different, far less sweeping plan. It appeared 
the restraining influence of the Communist Party, the KGB, 
and the Army was a major factor in Gorbachev's reversal.
The Communist Party, while issuing disclaimers regarding 
its monopoly on power in the Soviet government, still 
maintains a strong influence in all institutions of the 
central government. In addition, Gorbachev could not 
afford to further alienate the KGB and the Army, already 
upset by what they perceived to be Soviet security 
concessions to the West, with domestic protests increasing 
throughout the Soviet Union. These organizations might be 
needed to preserve the Soviet Union and its leader, 
President Mikhail Gorbachev.
The events of the summer of 1990 were followed by a 
series of personnel changes in the Soviet government and 
cabinet which appeared to reflect a policy of retrenchment 
by Gorbachev. The appointments of Valentin S. Pavlov to 
the post of Prime Minister, and Boris Pugo to the post of 
Interior Minister, and the nomination of Gennadi Yanayev as 
Vice-President of the Soviet Union by Gorbachev saw the 
reemergence of Communist Party conservatives in key 
positions of Soviet government. In addition, the 
unexpected resignation of Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze in December 1990, because he feared the 
possibility of dictatorship, further demonstrated that 
Gorbachev might be aligning himself more with the
conservatives in the Communist Party, the KGB, and the 
Soviet Army. In addition, the "brain thrust of 
perestroika," Aleksandr Yakolev, Stanislav Shatalin,
Nikolai Petrakov, and Vadim Bakatin, had either resigned or 
have been demoted and delegated little responsibility in 
the Soviet government (New York Times. January 27, 1991). 
The reasons for this realignment included the need to 
insure (1) the survival of Mikhail Gorbachev as President 
of the Soviet Union and leader of the Communist Party, and
(2) the support and control of the security forces of the 
Soviet Union to preserve the union in the face of strong 
independence movements throughout the 15 republics.
When considering the guestion of perestroika or 
retrenchment by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, the most 
significant of all events has been the appointment of 
Valentin Pavlov as Prime Minister. Since Pavlov has 
assumed the position of Prime Minister, Soviet policy, 
especially policy that has a direct bearing on foreign 
economic relations, has gone through a definite period of 
retrenchment. The first major policy change implemented by 
Pavlov was the withdrawal of 50 and 100 ruble notes from 
circulation, approximately 33 percent of the currency in 
circulation in the Soviet Union. The decree ordering the 
withdrawal, the first major act implemented by Gorbachev's 
new Cabinet of Ministers, stated the measure was designed 
to bring the Soviet economy and black market under control
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by reducing "speculation, corruption, smuggling, forgery, 
unearned income, and normalizing the monetary situation and 
the consumer market" (New York Times. January 23, 1991).
In February 1991, following negative public reaction to the 
measure, Pavlov attempted to justify the law by accusing 
banks in Switzerland, Austria, and Canada of plotting to 
(1) acquire billions of rubles on the black market, (2) 
flood the Soviet economy with these rubles in order to 
create hyperinflation and cause greater economic panic 
throughout the Soviet Union, and (3) overthrow Gorbachev in 
order to bring an end to Communist Party rule in the Soviet 
Union.
While Pavlov's actions may have diminished Soviet 
public outrage with the ruble withdrawal policy it may have 
alienated the Soviet government from Western financial 
institutions. The importance of this alienation is best 
described by an article in The Economist (February 16,
1991):
He [Pavlov] heads the government of a country with a 
recent history of unpaid trade obligations, rising 
foreign debt, and falling export revenues. Many 
bankers (Western) fear that the Soviet Union may have 
to reschedule its foreign debt in 1991 or 1992. In 
these circumstances, accusing Western banks of 
criminality risks undermining his own government's 
negotiating credibility. Some parts of the economy, 
especially the energy industry, urgently need Western 
investment . . . Yet Mr. Pavlov's welcome for foreign 
investment was distinctly cool.
The second retrenchment policy change implemented by 
Gorbachev, Pavlov, and the Cabinet of Ministers was the 
expansion of the role of the KGB in policing private 
enterprise, including Soviet joint ventures with the West. 
Pavlov suggested that these enterprises, especially the 
joint ventures with the West, were tools of the black 
market and contributed greatly to the stagnation of the 
Soviet economy. This Soviet policy change was not well 
received by Western firms engaged in Soviet joint ventures. 
An interview with an official of a Memphis medical firm 
involved in a Soviet joint venture (name of official and 
company withheld at request of company), suggested that any 
interference and intimidation by the KGB could cause their 
company to reconsider its business relationship with the 
Soviet Union. The company official stated that the 
retrenchment policies taken by the Soviet government could 
raise the company's cost of doing business to such a level 
that profits may not be attainable anytime in the near 
future. In particular, he suggested that the new policies 
could make repatriation of profits more difficult and would 
give the Soviet government greater control over the 
operation of the joint venture, which the company official 
suggested would result in greater inefficiency as well as 
other business and production problems. He also stated 
that the referendum on March 17 was another key factor 
concerning their future business relations with the Soviet
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Union as well as other Western firms' further business
relations with the Soviet Union. It appears that Western
investors viewed the referendum as an indicator of the
future of reform and economic liberalization in the Soviet
Union; thus its failure would have forced the central
government in Moscow to implement even stronger
retrenchment policies causing the further deterioration of
the Soviet political economy resulting in the potential
loss of Western investors in the Soviet economy.
On the other hand, support for the future of Soviet-
Western political economy, Soviet joint ventures with the
West, and this study can be found in the legislation
enacted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the parliaments of
the various republics in conjunction with decrees by
Gorbachev. Sarah Carey (1991:38) states:
The USSR is on the verge of a new era of foreign 
investment. The door to this vast market is no longer 
partially ajar; it is wide open. Foreign companies 
are no longer constrained to a narrow path, for they 
can go virtually anywhere in the Soviet economy, both 
geographically (with limited exceptions related to the 
vestiges of the Cold War) and in terms of the forms 
their investments take. While the centralized 
ministries and other state organizations still exist 
and still want to serve as the "channelers" or 
"handlers" of foreign investors, they are becoming 
increasingly irrelevant. The informed foreign 
investor now starts with the customer or the potential 
partner, not the customer's or partner's superior 
organization. The enterprise is now the basic 
building block in foreign trade. Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev has promulgated decrees emphasizing 
the importance of foreign trade to overall economic 
development, and this policy is reflected in a number 
of USSR Supreme Soviet enactments as well as in 
proposed and current legislation of the Russian 
Republic.
On June 4, 1990, the "Law on Enterprises in the USSR" 
(effective January 1, 1991) was passed by the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR. The law officially sanctioned and 
guaranteed the rights of several new (new to the Soviet 
economy) business forms such as corporations, partnerships, 
and cooperatives (Carey 1991). However, the key provision 
of the law allows foreigners to be the founders of 
enterprises and grants those enterprises independence in 
decisionmaking from the central bureaucracy. In addition, 
on October 26, 1990 Gorbachev issued a Presidential Decree 
that authorized 100 percent foreign ownership of 
enterprises in the Soviet Union. The door for direct 
foreign investment in the Soviet Union was now "wide open" 
and Western firms responded by engaging in more joint 
ventures. Between September 1, 1990, and March 1, 1991 the 
number of joint ventures in the Soviet Union rose 
approximately 42 percent.
Sarah Carey (1991) suggests that the explanation for 
the increase in Soviet joint ventures is relatively simple. 
She (1991:39) argues that "joint ventures are a proven, 
established business form in the USSR as in most of the 
world" and that joint ventures are "a better vehicle for 
locking in key partners whose involvement is crucial, 
because they control either natural resources, a customer 
network, real property, or some other asset." In addition, 
Carey states that Western "business can survive and even
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thrive despite intergovernmental conflicts." The empirical 
findings of this study support Carey's conclusions, as 
demonstrated in Chapter Four.
The procedure initially set forth by the January 1987 
edict for the establishment of joint ventures was 
complicated and unclear. The 1987 edict was only five 
pages long, providing a loose framework that limited 
foreign firms to owning no more than 49 percent of the 
joint venture and leaving the majority of the key decisions 
to the discretion of the joint venture's partners and 
governing boards. But under recently enacted amendments to 
the joint venture law and the aforementioned Presidential 
Decree issued in October, foreign firms are permitted to be 
the majority partner. It is entirely possible that a 
Soviet joint venture with a Western firm could be 100 
percent owned by a Western firm, controlled under its 
charter by citizens of the home country of the Western 
firm, and operated on a day to day basis by Western 
capitalist managers.
Four years later, the Soviet Ministry of Finance (the 
ministry responsible for the registration of Soviet joint 
ventures with the West) reports that 2375 joint ventures 
have been registered as of March 1, 1991. Soviet joint 
ventures have been established in almost every industry: 
energy, natural resources, food processing, chemical 
production, engineering services, telecommunications,
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transportation, tourism, consumer products, computers, and 
heavy industry (e.g., machinery) (Carey 1991). Carey 
(1990) argues that joint ventures "have demonstrated that, 
although the path to success is arduous, foreign investors 
can prosper and can have positive effects on the economy .
. . and have served as demonstration projects for many of 
the current economic reforms."
While political conflicts between conservatives and 
liberals continue in the Soviet Union, the overview above 
suggests that the compete integration of the Soviet economy 
into the IPE is a policy objective of both political 
factions in order to prevent the Soviet Union from being 
labeled as a permanently developing country (PDC) and 
thereby diminishing its status as an international 
superpower. The theoretical discussion of NEO and 
transaction costs presented in Chapter 3 and the empirical 
analysis of the Soviet joint, venture model will demonstrate 
that this study, the theoretical assumptions, and the model 
are still appropriate research tools because, despite the 
political conflict in the Soviet Union, economic reform 
continues to move in the direction of greater 
liberalization and integration. Soviet government policies 
and legislation that directly affect the Soviet economy 
have not been interrupted by the political conflict, as 
previously noted, this is especially true for economic 
policies and legislation that affect Soviet joint ventures.
But the Soviet Union, like the NEO world, is still a 
world where, for example, "individuals are only bounded 
rationally, legal enforcement of agreements is costly and 
imperfect, and opportunistic acts cannot be ruled out" 
(Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990:239). This makes cooperation 
difficult, "even when all parties are acting in good faith, 
and it therefore creates a demand for norms to enhance 
predictability and political and economic institutions to 
support exchange and other forms of cooperation" (Yarbrough 
and Yarbrough 1990:240). Uncertainty can also be increased 
if actors are engaging in opportunistic behavior, strategic 
behavior that is designed to deliberately conceal an 
actor's preferences or actions in order to achieve gains 
that improves its position while threatening the welfare 
and utility of other actors (Hodgson 1988:37-40).
Obviously, the facts suggest that the Soviet Union meets 
the criteria necessary for NEO and transaction-cost 
analysis. Therefore, a study of Soviet joint ventures with 
the West is relevant and important for understanding the 
Soviet-Western political economy, and to the larger 
international political economy.
CHAPTER TWO
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, COOPERATION, AND THEORIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
This study will integrate a relatively new 
theoretical framework within the existing IPE theories to 
bear on the problem of Soviet-Western trade to determine if 
Soviet joint ventures with the West have the potential to 
significantly affect Soviet-Western economic and political 
relations. But in order to introduce a new theoretical 
framework on Soviet-Western trade it is necessary to 
examine the existing theoretical frameworks on 
international trade that dominant the field of 
international politics and why they are deficient for 
purposes of understanding Soviet-Western trade relations. 
Currently, the literature on economic and political 
cooperation in international trade (including Soviet- 
Western trade) in the IPE subfield of international 
politics is found within the context of three dominant 
theories that evolve from the neorealist and pluralist 
paradigms: hegemonic stability theory, regime theory, and
the theory of reciprocal cooperation. This chapter 
presents an overview of each paradigm and examines the 
three dominant theories of international trade. In 
addition, it demonstrates that the problem with approaching 
Soviet-Western trade from these mainstream IPE theoretical 
frameworks is that they are designed specifically for the 
study of political and economic cooperation between nations
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with established, functioning free market economies. 
Therefore, attempts to apply only these theories to Soviet- 
Western trade is somewhat problematic because the Soviet 
Union has yet to establish a functioning market economy.
THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
The benefits of free international trade have long 
been promoted by classical and neo-classical economics (or 
liberalism). Liberalism teaches that since wealth is 
fundamentally a function of the extent of division of labor 
and scale of the market, states can increase their welfare 
(income or wealth) through specialization and trade 
according to comparative advantage. Yet, despite the 
potential benefits of economic cooperation, the historical 
record clearly shows that states often prefer forms of 
protectionism to liberal international trade (Conybeare
1987). Both the neorealist and pluralist schools explain 
non-cooperation and the breakdown of international trade by 
reference to the game theoretical model of the prisoner's 
dilemma. The prisoner's dilemma is a situation in which 
two actors can achieve mutual gain through cooperation, but 
often fail to achieve cooperation because each actor's 
payoff derived from taking advantage of the other's 
cooperation is greater than the payoff from mutual 
cooperation (Oye 1985).
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What factors give international trade the 
characteristics of a prisoner's dilemma? Although 
neorealists and pluralists both tend to accept the notion 
that international trade presents states with a prisoner's 
dilemma scenario, their differing theoretical assumptions 
lead them to postulate somewhat different variables as 
contributing to the problems posed by the prisoner's 
dilemma.
NEOREALISM, PLURALISM, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Neorealism, International Trade, and Cooperation
Neorealist analysis begins with the assumption that 
the essential characteristic of the international system is 
the competition for power and security among states. This 
competitive nature of international relations is an 
inherent trait produced by the anarchic structure of the 
international system (Waltz 1979:76-77). Under anarchy no 
sovereign authority exists to ensure the survival and 
security of individual states. Thus, the primary concern 
of states is to develop the means to provide for their 
security (Waltz 1979:111).
Neorealist theory posits that the state's primary 
concern for security limits cooperation in two ways.
States must worry about economic independence and 
maintaining a diversified economy (Waltz 1979:106-107).
Free international trade, according to liberal economic
theory, causes states to specialize in the production and 
trade of goods in which they have a comparative advantage. 
Neorealists argue that while a state may increase its 
national income through specialization in international 
trade according to comparative advantage in the short-run, 
in the long-run broader national security interests place 
limits on specialization. States have an interest in 
developing and maintaining a diversified and structurally 
competitive and efficient economy, and to a achieve this 
objective states frequently intervene in the market through 
the use of subsidies and protectionist measures.
Neorealists argue that specialization offers at least 
five potential long-run costs to the welfare and security 
of the individual states. First, some economic sectors, 
such as steel and food, are strategically important because 
they are vital to military preparedness and national 
survival. States which fail to develop these strategically 
important sectors or to let them decline become vulnerable 
to the possibility of trade embargoes and massive shortages 
during periods of international conflict. Second, 
specialization may cause a state to suffer serious economic 
losses if the demand for its goods falls unexpectedly. 
Third, a state that is competitive in a wide range of goods 
has considerable economic leverage, which can enable the 
state to improve its terms of trade during periods of 
negotiation with other states (Knorr 1977; Yarbrough and
Yarbrough 1986). Fourth, economic leverage can also 
provide a state greater political leverage in the IPE, 
which can result in the achievement of security and other 
political objectives in international regimes such as the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Finally, industrial and high 
technology sectors must be promoted over the primary 
product sectors if the market does not encourage the 
development of those sectors because industry and 
technology have positive spill over effects that enhance 
the long-run economic welfare of the state and provide it 
with a technologically more sophisticated and powerful 
military (Gilpin 1987:32-33).
The second way in which anarchy constrains 
international cooperation is that the pursuit of security 
forces states to be "defensively positional" actors in 
their economic relations with other states (Greico 1988). 
Defensive positionality applies to actors whose fundamental 
goal is not to maximize their own absolute gains, but "to 
prevent others from achieving advances in their relative 
capabilities" (Greico 1988:490). In other words, 
neorealists argue that states want economic cooperation to 
preserve or enhance their relative power and security vis- 
a-vis other states, especially rivals. According to Greico 
(1988:492), neorealists assume that to achieve this
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objective a state will many times "decline to join . . . 
leave, or . . . sharply limit its commitment to a 
cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are 
achieving, or are likely to achieve relatively greater 
gains."
In summary, neorealism postulates that, in their 
economic relations, states strive to maximize a utility 
function that is dependent not only upon increases in their 
own payoffs but also on the maintenance of a diversified 
and structurally competitive economy and on a favorable 
distribution of the benefits that cooperation affords. 
Intuitively one perceives that the proposition that states 
are defensively positional renders free trade problematic 
to the extent that states are not merely concerned with 
increasing their own payoffs but with avoiding relative 
losses in the distribution of trade gains. Consequently, 
free trade becomes less likely and the probability of the 
prisoner's dilemma outcome of mutual defection increases.
Pluralism, International Trade, and Cooperation
Pluralists begin their analysis with the basic 
assumption that the essential characteristic of the 
contemporary IPE is that of complex interdependence.
Complex interdependence is a condition in which states have 
both security and economic interests, and in which the 
latter are not necessarily subordinate to the former
27
(Keohane and Nye 1988:24-25). Therefore, the condition of 
complex interdependence implies that states' interests in 
cooperation are as strong as their interest in competition.
Complex interdependence is defined as a network of 
crisis crossing relationships that have the potential to be 
both costly and beneficial to actors in the international 
system (Keohane and Nye 1988:23). While neorealism views 
states as the only important actors in the international 
system, pluralism assumes that a variety of non-state 
actors are linked in ways that may be important to 
international relations. The behavior of non-state actors 
may affect outcomes directly, as when a powerful 
multinational bank decides whether to make loans to 
developing nations and when multinational corporations 
(MNCs) turn from a strategy of horizontal integration to 
vertical integration (Gilpin 1987:254-256).
Pluralists stress that sub-state and non-state actors 
influence international relations indirectly through their 
impact on state policy. Unlike the defensively positional 
argument of neorealism, pluralism assumes that under the 
conditions of complex interdependence states are fragmented 
actors whose policies reflect the interests of sub-state 
and non-state actors. The state's economic policy is 
assumed to be the product of the relative power and 
political pressure of various interest groups. Interest 
groups include domestic coalitions, transnational actors
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such as MNCs and transgovernmental coalitions (Keohane and 
Nye 1988:30-32). Thus, the state is not, on most economic 
issues, a coherent unitary actor that necessarily pursues 
security over wealth as neorealists suggest.
Pluralism, however, does acknowledge the realist 
distinction between "high politics" (military and security 
issues) and "low politics" (economic and other issues) and 
accepts that with respect to certain security issues 
realism's assumptions may be accurate. Yet, in economic 
matters, pluralism is not satisfied with explanations that 
link international cooperation to the power and security 
concerns of states. Explicit in pluralism is the idea that 
modern technology, modern forms of socioeconomic 
organizations (e.g., transnational capitalism), and modern 
forms of political organization have altered the character 
of international relations. In the contemporary 
international system, pluralists expect that the state's 
economic policies will be shaped as often by its relations 
with non-state actors and by economic forces as by its 
relations with other states and its military and strategic 
interests.
Because pluralism regards the international system as 
a complex environment and state policy as a product of 
complex forces, pluralists have identified a wide variety 
of factors that constitute impediments to international 
trade. For example, workers and certain domestic
industries whose incomes may be threatened by foreign 
economic competition often use their political power to 
pressure their government to enact tariffs or other non­
tariff protectionist measures that will reduce the 
competitiveness of foreign goods in the domestic market 
(Friman 1988). On the other hand, MNCs, perceiving their 
interests to be best served by economic liberalism 
(openness), are likely to pressure policy makers to reduce 
tariffs and other non-tariff protectionist measures (Milner 
1988). A corollary of the idea that domestic and 
transnational interests affect state economic policy is the 
notion that the particular institutional structure of a 
state, and the degree to which its institutions enable 
particular interest groups to influence economic policy, 
will be a major determinant of a state's trade policy (Lake
1988) .
Finally, pluralism often traces protectionist policies 
to macroeconomic conditions such as surplus capacity, 
business cycles, and global economic instability (Calleo 
1982; McKeown 1983; Strange and Tooze 1984; Yarbrough and 
Yarbrough 1987a). Whereas neorealism emphasizes the 
distribution of overall military and economic capabilities 
as a determinant of outcomes in international relations, 
pluralism examines the distribution of capabilities across 
particular issue areas and sectors in an effort to 
understand the international system. This is necessary
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because on issues involving complex interdependence overall 
military and economic power is not usually an effective 
instrument of foreign policy. In other words, broad based 
military and economic power is no longer fungible in the 
modern international system.
Pluralists posit that any number of economic or 
domestic political factors may influence state policy in 
ways that exacerbate the prisoner's dilemma aspect of 
international trade and thereby inhibit cooperation in the 
liberalization of international trade. Yet to list a 
series of pluralist impediments to international trade is 
perhaps to overemphasize the causes of non-cooperation 
within pluralism and neorealism on the broader issue of 
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade.
In simplest terms cooperation is much more the norm for 
pluralism than for neorealism. This is evident from the 
fact that neorealist theories of international political 
economy are fundamentally theories of non-cooperation. 
Neorealism stresses that distributional conflict over the 
gains from international trade is ever present in 
international political economy and that this conflict 
continually makes free international trade problematic. 
While pluralism, on the other hand, has identified specific 
factors leading to non-cooperation, it has also developed 
explicit theories of cooperation. As shall be illustrated 
next, when the three dominant theories of international
trade found in the IPE literature are examined, the 
conditions that must be met for cooperation in the 
liberalization of international trade to emerge and be 
sustained are much less stringent in pluralist theories of 
international cooperation than in the theories of 
international cooperation that are consistent with basic 
neorealist assumptions.
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Although the historical record documents a great deal 
of protectionism it also chronicles periods of sustained 
cooperation among states. Indeed, liberal world economies 
have been predominant in the modern era (Krasner 1976). 
While both neorealism and pluralism have sought to 
understand when and how sustained international economic 
cooperation occurs, they have also sought to understand 
when and how sustained international economic cooperation 
is possible given the prisoner's dilemma aspect of economic 
relations. In general, three basic theories have dominated 
the massive body of IPE literature of the last two decades: 
hegemonic stability theory, regime theory, and the theory 
of reciprocal cooperation. Hegemonic stability theory is 
usually emphasized by neorealists, while regime theory and 
the theory of reciprocal cooperation are usually emphasized 
by pluralists.
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Hegemonic Stability Theory
Hegemonic stability theory emerged in the early 1970s 
and remains a widely accepted and influential account of 
international economic cooperation and free trade regimes. 
Hegemonic stability theory maintains that a "hegemonic 
power is a necessary, albeit not a sufficient condition for 
the full development of a world market economy" (Gilpin 
1987:86). In part, a hegemon promotes free international 
trade by providing certain financial and monetary functions 
such as serving as a "lender of last resort" and 
maintaining stable international exchange rates 
(Kindleberger 1973, 1983). More importantly, however, the 
hegemon promotes free international trade through its power 
to bribe states that would otherwise prefer protection to 
liberal international trade. In this situation, the 
hegemon overcomes the prisoner's dilemma aspect of trade by 
making side payments or trade concessions that induce 
states, which would otherwise choose protectionism, to 
pursue free international trade (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 
1987a). Once free international trade has been 
established, the sizeable gains that states realize from 
trading on the hegemon's large domestic market enable the 
hegemon to use the threat that it will close its market as 
an additional efficacious enforcement mechanism for keeping 
the IPE open (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1987a).
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Given the emphasis neorealism places on the obstacles 
to trade, hegemonic stability theory is the best and 
perhaps the only theory of cooperation that is fully 
compatible with neorealism's theory of non-cooperation. 
Given the relative gain problem that exists among 
defensively positional units, a hegemonic power is 
necessary to pay bribes and coerce states that feel that 
they would lose in relative terms from cooperation in the 
liberalization of international trade.
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, hegemonic 
stability theory became the object of increasing criticism. 
The continued operation of the liberal IPE in the face of 
what appeared to most observers as hegemonic decline on the 
part of the United States led researchers to examine more 
closely the empirical and theoretical validity of hegemonic 
stability theory. The result was the discovery of 
significant empirical evidence that appeared to contradict 
the hegemonic stability hypotheses that (1) widespread and 
sustained economic cooperation is unlikely in the absence 
of a hegemon, and (2) hegemonic systems are more open than 
non-hegemonic systems (Gilpin 1987:91).
Neither cross-sectional nor time series analysis 
reveals a strong relationship between hegemony and openness 
in international trade (Conybeare 1984). Stephen Krasner 
(1976) demonstrated that openness and closure in trade in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not correspond
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closely with the rise and decline of British and American 
hegemony. In particular, liberal international trade 
appears to continue to prevail for a considerable period of 
time after a hegemon has begun to decline. Although 
British hegemonic decline was marked by a modest closure of 
the IPE during the last two decades of the 19th century, 
the years 1900-13 (clearly years of marked British 
hegemonic decline) were ones of increasing openness 
(Krasner 1976:357). Similarly, despite the fact that non­
tariff and other forms of protectionism have clearly 
increased over the last two decades and that managed and 
strategic trade is on the rise, trade has remained 
remarkably open during the period of declining United 
States hegemony (Nye 1990:143-145). Trade actually 
continued to expand until the 1982 world recession (Strange 
1985). In sum, hegemonic decline does not, as hegemonic 
stability theory suggests, necessarily mean closure of the 
IPE.
Regime Theory
In the 1970s, regime theory emerged to explain the 
fact that the liberal IPE was persisting despite the 
apparent erosion of U.S. hegemony. The regime literature 
flourished in the 1980s, as international political 
economists sought to explore the utility of institutions in 
achieving and maintaining cooperation in the international
system (Krasner 1983:2-3). This approach to institutions 
has relied upon the neoclassical analogy, and has focused 
on the collective action/public goods approach, emphasizing 
the importance of enforcement, commitment, and strategic 
interactions for international cooperation (Keohane 
1984:7-9; Oye 1986). Employing these various approaches in 
the field of international politics illustrates the 
importance of transaction costs (e.g., uncertainty and 
information) in achieving international economic and 
security cooperation. Regime theory argues that regimes, 
defined as norms, principles, and rules around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue area, may serve as 
an intervening or independent variable in promoting 
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade. 
Although regimes may have their roots in a particular 
distribution of power, regimes may persist and promote 
continuing cooperation even after the underlying 
distribution of power that gave rise to the regimes has 
changed. Therefore, regime theory attempts to explain how 
the liberal IPE could continue to function in the 1970s and 
1980s even though U.S. hegemony was in decline.
Robert Keohane (1984:85-97) argues that regimes 
facilitate cooperation in the IPE by reducing the 
transaction costs that normally result in market failure 
and externalities. Keohane states:
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Market failure refers to situations in which outcomes 
of market-mediated interactions are suboptimal given 
the utility functions of actors and the resources at 
their disposal. That is agreements that would be 
beneficial to all parties are not made. . . .  In 
situations of market failure the difficulties are 
attributed not to inadequacies of the actors 
themselves (who are assumed to be rational utility 
maximizers), but rather to the structure of the system 
and the institutions, or lack thereof, that 
characterize it. Specific attributes of the system 
impose transaction costs that create barriers to 
effective cooperation among the actors. Thus 
institutional defects are responsible for failures of 
coordination. To correct these defects, conscious 
institutional innovation (e.g., international regimes 
and joint ventures) may be necessary (1984:82-83).
Externalities occur when "one actor A, in the course
of rendering some service to a second actor B, incidentally
also renders services or disservices to other persons . . .
of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted from the
benefitted parties or compensation enforced on behalf of
the injured parties" (Head 1974:185). Ronald Coase (i960)
and Robert Keohane (1984:85-86) offer the classic example
of an externality: the paint factory and the laundry
service next door. In the course of producing their paint,
the factory generates emissions that settle on clothes hung
to dry in the yard of the neighboring laundry. The smoke
dirties the clothes, and the cleaner must relaunder them.
The laundry has no possible means of avoiding the smoke,
and is not compensated for its detrimental effect. The
factory has seemingly no incentive for reducing smoke
output, nor for compensating the laundry for the costs of
rewashing the clothes. To correct the externality, the
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cost to the laundry must somehow be incorporated into the 
factory's production costs. Externalities and market 
failure arise in the IPE as a result of the transaction 
costs that create barriers to political and economic 
cooperation among actors in the system. Keohane argues 
that "international regimes perform the valuable functions 
of reducing the costs of legitimate transactions, while 
increasing the costs of illegitimate ones, and of reducing 
uncertainty" (1984:107).
While regime theory introduces the transaction-cost 
framework to the study of international politics, 
attempting to apply regime theory to a detailed analysis of 
Soviet-Western political economy is problematic for two 
reasons. First, regime theory is designed specifically to 
study and explain the continuing existence of a Western 
dominated international trading system in age of apparent 
declining United States hegemony. Second, regime theory is 
inherently difficult to put to empirical tests, a 
difficulty that is compounded by the problem of pinpointing 
the exact moment when hegemony has eroded to a sufficient 
degree that regimes alone are the sustaining force of 
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade.
The Theory of Reciprocal Cooperation
Recently, a third explanation for continuing 
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade in
an era of hegemonic decline has emerged. This explanation 
has its origins in the game theoretical analysis of Robert 
Axelrod (1984). Instead of focusing directly on regimes as 
independent variables explaining cooperation, this theory 
of cooperation in the liberalization of international trade 
uses game theoretic analysis to explain the way in which 
regimes emerge and are maintained. This analysis implies 
that cooperation in the liberalization of international 
trade may be established and maintained spontaneously when 
economic and other conditions are favorable, even in the 
absence of regimes.
Robert Axelrod (1984) has shown that in situations 
where actors (or players to use his terminology) expect to 
continue to play the prisoner's dilemma game, a tit-for-tat 
strategy tends to dominate as long as the players can 
communicate and do not discount the future too heavily. 
Under these conditions players will ordinarily cooperate 
contingent on the other players cooperating on the 
subsequent play. Thus, on the surface, Axelrod's analysis 
suggests that the continuous nature of international trade 
relations can encourage cooperation based on reciprocity. 
From this theoretical perspective the primary threats to 
cooperation are the domestic economic and political factors 
that were discussed in the previous section on pluralist 
impediments to free international trade. Changes in these 
variables may alter the payoff structure or change the
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interests of actors in ways that encourage opportunistic 
defection.
Theoretical Differences Between Neorealism and Pluralism 
and the Problem of Soviet-Western Trade
Neorealists have been quick to criticize the pluralist 
argument that reciprocity can be a basis for sustained 
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade. 
Because states are assumed to be defensively positional, 
neorealists find that the concepts of reciprocity and tit- 
for-tat are inadequate to sustain cooperation in the 
liberalization of international trade (Greico 1988). 
Neorealists point out that Axelrod's analysis rests on the 
assumption that actors are egoistic. Egoistic actors have 
the primary objective of maximizing their absolute utility 
and gain irrespective of the gain of other actors. As has 
been illustrated, neorealists assume that states strive not 
to maximize their absolute gain in international economic 
relations but to preserve their relative positions vis-a- 
vis other states, thus making states defensively positional 
rather than egoistic (Greico 1988; Stein 1984).
The basis of cooperation among defensively positional 
units is not tit-for-tat but rather an equitable 
distribution of gains among cooperating parties, a 
distribution that while sustaining economic growth also 
roughly preserves the existing position of states within 
the IPE. Since there is no reason to assume that
reciprocity will necessarily produce equitable gains that 
preserve the existing distribution of power, reciprocity 
alone is not a sufficient condition of cooperation in 
liberalization of international trade or more specifically 
Soviet-Western trade. Indeed, if equity is the basis for 
cooperation, reciprocity might be harmful to cooperation in 
the liberalization of international trade, particularly 
Soviet-Western trade, because reciprocity requires 
retaliation against all forms of protectionism whereas 
equity often requires toleration of most measures of 
protectionism.
Reciprocity may be effective for preventing 
opportunistic protectionism, protectionism that seeks not 
to achieve such equitable distribution of gains from trade 
but rather to achieve such great gains as improve a state's 
position and threatens the domestic and strategic welfare 
of that state's trading partner. But reciprocity alone 
cannot assure equity given the free functioning of the 
international market. To be consistent with neorealism, a 
theory of non-hegemonic cooperation must recognize that 
cooperation is based not just on reciprocity but also on 
arrangements that ensure an equitable distribution of 
international trade among states. In other words, 
hegemonic type functions that ensure equity are seen as a 
necessary condition for the sustained functioning of the 
liberal IPE. Those states that gain in relative terms from
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trade must be willing and able to make concessions to the 
losers, concessions that take the place of hegemonic bribes 
in keeping international trade open. Therefore, some other 
mechanism that provides equity must supplement reciprocity 
for a liberal IPE to prevail among defensively positional 
units.
It must be noted that reciprocity alone as a basis of 
sustained cooperation in the liberalization of 
international trade is theoretically problematic for 
pluralism as well. First, pluralism assumes that the state 
is pluralistic. If state policy reflects a pluralistic 
struggle among competing interests then that policy will 
not always be egoistic (e.g., will not always aim to 
maximize national income). Rather, overall national 
welfare will sometimes be subordinated in the interest of 
maximizing or protecting the interests and income of 
particular industries and other groups. In addition, 
reciprocity clearly does not provide an adequate 
explanation of trade outcomes in the contemporary era. 
Increasingly free international trade has been replaced by 
"fair trade" as states negotiate a network of voluntary 
export restraints and other agreements that essentially 
allocate certain shares of markets to particular states and 
thereby distribute international trade gains more equitably 
than might the free international market (Gilpin 1987:204- 
228). States have exhibited a willingness to tolerate
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protectionism on the part of their trade partners in 
certain sectors in exchange for the partners' continued 
openness in other sectors and/or the partners' reciprocity 
in tolerating protectionism in certain sectors.
It appears that for all the effort to understand the 
basis of economic cooperation and cooperation in the 
liberalization of international trade, the field of 
international politics remains divided if not confused on 
the subject. In addition, when the politics and economics 
of Soviet-Western trade issues are added to the analysis 
the current theoretical literature on the IPE is 
inadequate. The problem with approaching Soviet-Western 
trade from these mainstream IPE theoretical frameworks is 
that they are assigned specifically for trade between 
nations with established and functioning liberal economies. 
However, some conclusions on the current theoretical 
perspectives found in the IPE literature are justified.
First, on the basis of the empirical evidence and 
theoretical insights, multiple factors are capable of 
influencing economic and political cooperation in the 
liberalization of international trade. Friman (1988) 
suggests that an integrative approach that takes into 
account domestic and systemic variables and that looks at 
specific sectors as well as specific nations is necessary 
to develop adequate explanations of international trade 
policy choices. Second, security concerns in the long-run
may influence trade appreciably. It may be that the 
relative loss of wealth and power of a hegemon, for 
example, will eventually lead to a posture of defensive 
positionality on the part of the hegemon, and hence to 
significant closure of the IPE. Yet, the historical record 
clearly indicates that hegemons do not take such a turn in 
international trade policy lightly. Both Britain in the 
nineteenth century and the U.S. in the twentieth century 
have demonstrated that declining hegemons tend to retain 
liberal trade policies even after trade has begun to erode 
their relative power position. Third, though it does not 
appear to relate so much to security as to domestic 
political and economic concerns, there is clearly a 
relative gain problem concomitant with international trade. 
States seek to intervene in international trade in order to 
protect certain industries and sectors from foreign 
competition. Finally, there is also the problem of 
"linkage" where liberal governments intervene in trade and 
use it as leverage to achieve other goals.
The coming of Europe 1992, the rise of the newly
industrialized nations (NICs) of Asia, and the political 
and economic initiatives taken by the Soviet Union and the 
nations of Eastern Europe to become more involved in the
IPE have resulted in a contemporary world economy that is
growing increasingly competitive, and therefore the 
incentives for state intervention in the IPE have greatly
increased. This last point implies that neither hegemonic 
stability theory, nor regime theory, nor the theory of 
reciprocal cooperation are adeguate, in and of themselves, 
to explain the impact of or the motivation for joint 
ventures between the Soviet Union and Western firms. An 
additional theoretical framework needs to be incorporated 
into the IPE literature to explain the integration and 
impact of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe states in 
the world economy. The new economics of organization (NEO) 
offers transaction-cost economics theory as a solution to 
this deficiency in the IPE literature. This study will 
demonstrate that the inclusion of NEO into the existing IPE 
literature is theoretically justified and necessary in 
order to adequately analyze and explain the factors that 
contribute to the establishment of joint ventures between 
the Soviet Union and Western firms.
CHAPTER THREE 
THE NEW ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATION AND 
SOVIET-WESTERN POLITICAL ECONOMY
Since the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of 
Nations in 1776, economic research has focused primarily on 
five factors (prices, supply, demand, income, resource 
allocation) that affect the functioning and efficiency of 
markets and economic systems. But in any complex economy, 
there exist numerous other factors that can have a major 
impact on the organization of economic activity. Included 
among them are (1) the administrative and internal 
organization of production and exchange between firms or 
states, (2) the contractual relations between firms or 
states, and (3) government control through law, policies, 
and regulations (e.g. tariffs, quotas, export controls) 
(McCloskey 1985:224-228). Orthodox neoclassical economics 
has failed to examine thoroughly the relationship between 
the functioning and efficiency of markets and non-market 
activity (e.g., institutional arrangements and contractual 
agreements). The reason for this neglect remains unclear 
in the current literature on the subject.
In principle, the methodology of neoclassical economics 
offers a framework for analyzing institutional form. 
Institutional arrangements are decisions made by economic 
agents and should be examined as part of an agent's overall 
optimization problem. In practice, however, neoclassical 
economics has never formulated the issue of institutional
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efficiency in that context. Neoclassical economic theory 
assumes agents make decisions within a particular 
institutional arrangement, and the efficiency consequences 
of those decisions are evaluated relative to the Paretian 
ideal. The problem with this approach is its failure to 
adequately explain either the evolution of those 
arrangements in the first place or the persistence of 
ostensible inefficient institutions thereafter, which 
implies that the neoclassical model ignores the opportunity 
costs found in alternative mechanisms and contractual 
arrangements (Williamson 1986:85-98). In order to explain 
these phenomena a theory is needed that is capable of 
demonstrating that the losses resulting from the use of one 
method of organization (e.g., institutional arrangements, 
contractual agreements) are greater than the cost implied 
by the available options. The new economics of 
organization (NEO) and transaction-cost analysis addresses 
this problem. This chapter will explain NEO and 
transaction-cost analysis and examine their theoretical 
connection and importance to international politics and 
Soviet-Western political economy.
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TRANSACTION-COST ANALYSIS
Transaction-Cost Analysis: The Conceptual Framework
Transaction-cost analysis forces the analyst to 
recognize that from the economic agent's point of view the 
net value of a given transaction reflects not only the 
losses due to the potential misallocation of resources, but 
also the costs of conducting the transaction itself. From 
this perspective, transaction costs take on a decisive role 
in the analysis of institutional efficiency, for in their 
absence all gains from trade would be realized by rational 
self-interest seeking agents forming cooperative agreements 
(Coase 1960). Therefore, once we have ascribed costs to 
such activities as observation, communication, and 
negotiation, the possibility of a divergence between 
cooperative and non-cooperative solutions emerge as agents 
attempt to exploit circumstantial advantages. Since 
transaction costs in effect drive a wedge between actual 
and potential outcomes, our attention is naturally directed 
toward the character of those costs.
As previously stated, transaction-cost analysis is the 
product of the new subfield of economics called the new 
economics of organization (NEO), or institutional 
economics. NEO is an interdisciplinary approach to 
institutions and that incorporates contributions from law, 
organization theory, economics, and other social sciences.
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While the origins of NEO are grounded in the study of the
firm, the central research focus of NEO is "precisely those
of political economy" as defined by Susan Strange in her
book States and Markets. Strange (1988:18-19) states:
IPE concerns the social, political, and economic 
arrangements affecting the global systems of 
production, exchange, distribution, and the mix of 
values reflected therein.
Oliver Williamson explains that transaction-cost 
analysis is a product of NEO based upon Herbert Simon’s 
assumption "that human agents are subject to bounded 
rationality, whence behavior is intendedly rational, but 
only limited so, and are given to opportunism" (Williamson 
1985:30). The basic unit of analysis is the transaction, 
which John Commons (1950:21) defined as a "joint action 
where performance is executed in accordance with 
established rules" (usually a contractual agreement). The 
implicit assumption of Commons’ definition is that any 
direct or indirect contracting problem can be examined with 
transaction-cost analysis (Ouchi 1980; Williamson 
1986:187). A transaction-cost analysis of Soviet joint 
ventures with the West and their impact on cooperation and 
liberalization of Soviet-Western trade, therefore, would be 
justified because of the contractual nature of Soviet joint 
ventures with the West.
What are the essential characteristics of the basic 
unit of analysis, the transaction? Ronald Coase's "The 
Problem of Social Cost" (1960) suggested that transaction
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costs include all information, negotiation, investment,
contracting, maintenance, and enforcing costs
of a joint action. Beth and Robert Yarbrough (1990) state:
The transaction is not an instantaneous exchange in a 
world of perfectly specified property rights and 
perfectly enforced contracts; rather it is a 
relationship in which performance may be non- 
simultaneous and non-performance may leave an 
aggrieved party with little recourse. Given these 
elements of anarchy, cooperation requires an 
institutional structure consistent with self- 
enforcement or self-help.
Oliver Williamson has condensed the characteristics of 
transaction costs into two distinct categories: ex-ante
and ex-post transaction costs. Ex-ante transaction costs 
are the costs involved in the negotiation, drafting, and 
establishment (e.g.,initial capital investment) of a joint 
action (e.g., a joint venture or merger) that aligns the 
incentives of the actors involved, and allows an internal 
system of institutions and norms control of the 
relationship (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Williamson 
1985:32-34). Ex-post transaction costs are the costs 
involved in the day to day operation, maintenance, and 
governance of a joint action. Ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs may be incurred as the result of 
activities which are directly productive, which implies 
that transaction costs are incurred in the course of 
organizing and maintaining an economic or political 
activity and thus may vary with organizational form (Coase 
I960). Kenneth Arrow (1969) states:
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The distinction between transaction costs and 
production costs is that the former can be varied by a 
change in the mode or resource allocation, 
organization, and operation of organized activity, 
while the latter only depend on technology and output, 
and would be the same in all systems.
While a clear and concise definition of transaction
costs is essential to an analysis of Soviet joint ventures
with the West, there exist two other crucial components of
transaction-cost analysis that demand our attention: the
process from which transaction costs emerge, and asset
specificity.
John Commons (1950) stated that in order for
transaction costs to exist and be measured the following
process must transpire:
In point of time sequence, the transaction has three 
stages: first, the negotiations, which are closed
when the agreement on intentions is reached; then the 
contract or commitment, which imposed the obligation 
of performance and payment upon the parties in future 
time; finally the administration or performance of the 
obligations agreed upon, when completed by both 
parties, closes the transaction.
And with respect to the latter, Oliver Williamson (1986:17)
argues that the most critical dimension of transaction-cost
analysis is the condition of asset specificity. Asset
specificity exists when transaction-specific (or
idiosyncratic) investment is undertaken in a joint action.
Transaction-specific investment occurs when capital assets
(e.g., human resources, natural resources, goods) are
specifically designed for a particular use, and where the
alternative use (opportunity costs) of the assets invested
are low (Williamson 1986:106-107; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 
1987a). Specificity is perhaps best thought of in spatial 
terms. The decision to invest in a transaction-specific 
asset is comparable to the selection of a more or less 
unique product, process, or site from among a set of 
alternative characteristics, technologies, or locations. 
Williamson (1986:107) further argues that asset specificity 
transforms a bilateral relationship into a bilateral 
monopoly because, as a result of transaction-specific 
investment, the loss of the relationship would result in 
significant excess capacity and other economic losses due 
to high transaction costs. Asset specificity implies that 
it is usually to the mutual advantage of each contracting 
party to maintain a joint action because each party to the 
agreement has become a "hostage" to the relationship 
(Telser 1980; Williamson 1983; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 
1986). The literature on transaction-cost analysis assumes 
that any investment that is not transaction-specific is a 
general purpose or non-specialized investment, which has a 
discretely higher value in its next best use (opportunity 
costs).
Another essential element of asset specificity is that 
the transaction-specific investment exchange transpires 
once the required resources have been committed on the part 
of the investor, or in other words that the investment is 
durable. If expenditures, asset life, and exchange were
instantaneous, appropriate quasi-rents could not exist, 
since alternative buyers and sellers would always be 
available. The fact that assets are durable implies that 
transaction-specific relationships should persist for an 
appreciable period (Williamson 1986:105-109). It is the 
absence of continuous alternatives in the wake of 
transaction-specific investments which gives rise to 
transactional frictions. When investments are non­
specialized, opportunistic inclinations are attenuated by 
the ability of either party to turn to alternative partners 
should one seek to gain at the expense of the other 
(opportunism). When investments are transaction-specific 
in nature, however, agents become able to employ variables 
such as output, effort, quality, and information in a 
strategic fashion which alters the distribution of the 
surplus or rent accruing to those assets in their favor 
(Williamson 1986:110).
Transaction-Cost Analysis and Soviet-Western Economic and 
Political Cooperation
The failure of neoclassical economics to examine the 
relationship between market and non-market activity has 
also inhibited the development of viable theories of 
international political economy that are capable of 
explaining the role of international institutional 
arrangements and contractual agreements in governing and 
facilitating cooperation in the IPE. Critics of
neoclassical economics argue that the failure of 
neoclassical theories of international trade can be 
attributed to the apolitical and ahistorical nature of the 
assumptions and methodologies of those theories (Coase 
1960; Conybeare 1980; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1987b). 
Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1987a;4) also argue that 
neoclassical economics has ignored the basic assumption of 
transaction costs in international trade because 
neoclassical theory "posits trade as a situation of near 
perfect harmony, zero transaction costs, a positive sum 
game with little room for strategy, negotiation, or 
disagreements."
The failure of neoclassical economics to develop 
international trade theories that explain the way in which 
institutional arrangements and contractual agreements 
govern and facilitate trade has stimulated research in 
other disciplines, primarily international politics, in 
search of a truly systemic theory of international trade. 
The pioneer efforts of such individuals as Kindleberger, 
Keohane, Krasner, and Strange have resulted in viable 
alternative theories of international trade found in the 
literature on international cooperation and international 
regimes. While these theories offer a "useful analysis of 
a specific institution or historical episode" they fail to 
develop a "systematic theory to explain the wide range of 
international trade institutions, and contractual
agreements, that have existed under differing economic 
conditions" (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1987b). In addition 
the analytical frameworks of these theories of 
international cooperation and regimes and are not 
completely conducive to an analysis of Soviet-Western 
trade.
Transaction-cost analysis' emphasis on institutions, 
contracts, economic conditions, rules, enforcement, and 
opportunism provides the framework for a truly systematic 
theory of international trade and cooperation that can 
explain the role of these variables in governing and 
facilitating East-West, West-West, and North-South trade. 
The relevant world for NEO is a world or institutional 
setting in which uncertainty prevails, a world where, for 
example, "individuals are only bounded rationally, legal 
enforcement of agreements is costly and imperfect, and 
opportunistic acts cannot be ruled out" (Yarbrough and 
Yarbrough 1990:239). In this environment relatively 
complex institutional structures may be required for 
mutually beneficial associations and arrangements that 
deter opportunism (such as Soviet joint ventures).
The scope of uncertainty in the NEO environment is 
further increased by bounded rationality and opportunism 
because they may result in incompletely specified and 
imperfectly obeyed agreements. In addition, the scope of 
uncertainty can be increased by an actor's lack of
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information about other actor's motivations, perceptions,
preferences, and actions (Hodgson 1988:21-24). This makes
cooperation difficult, "even when all parties are acting in
good faith, and it therefore creates a demand for norms to
enhance predictability and political and economic
institutions to support exchange and other forms of
cooperation" (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990:240).
Uncertainty may also increase if actors are engaging in
opportunistic protection behavior, strategic behavior that
is designed to deliberately conceal an actor's preferences
or actions in order to achieve gains that improves its
position while threatening the welfare and utility of other
actors (Hodgson 1988:37-30; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990).
Because of these conditions, the problem in this type of
environment "becomes one of devising institutions that will
facilitate cooperation by safeguarding against opportunism,
maintaining flexibility, forestalling disputes, and
mediating any disputes that do arise" (Yarbrough and
Yarbrough 1990:240). A careful examination of the NEO
environment reveals an environment similar to the IPE in a
world of complex interdependence as described by Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye in their book Power and
Interdependence. Keohane and Nye (1988:253-254) state:
From the foreign policy standpoint, the problem facing 
individual governments is how to benefit from 
international exchange while maintaining as much 
autonomy as possible. From the perspective of the 
international system, the problem is how to generate 
and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of
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cooperation in the face of competing efforts by 
governments, and nongovernmental actors, to manipulate 
the system for their own benefit.
A transaction-cost analysis of Soviet joint ventures with
the West and their impact on East-West economic and
political relations, therefore, would also be justified
because Soviet joint ventures occur within a NEO like
environment consisting of (1) complex institutional and
contractual agreements, (2) the uncertain nature of Soviet
joint ventures, (3) the unsettled Soviet political and
economic climate, and (4) the anarchic structure of the
international system.
Geoffrey Hodgson, Oliver Williamson, and Beth and
Robert Yarbrough have all contributed to the development of
the analytical framework from a systematic theory of
international trade based on transaction-cost analysis not
found in the current literature of neoclassical economics
and international politics. Yarbrough and Yarbrough
(1987b:130) provide additional justification for the
application of transaction-cost analysis to the study of
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade:
International trade presents a fertile ground for 
transaction-cost analysis for two reasons. First, an 
additional level of potential opportunism is 
introduced. A British firm entering into trade 
involving substantial transaction-specific investment 
with a French firm faces two potential levels of 
opportunism: the French firms may threaten to halt
trade in order to alter the prices at which trade 
occurs and the British states may threaten to halt the 
relationship by imposing trade restrictions. This 
second level of opportunism enriches the implications 
of the transaction-cost framework since organizational
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forms should reflect the additional sources of 
transactional insecurity. Second, the enforcement 
institution of the state is weak or absent in 
international transactions making the lack of 
efficacious third-party adjudication and enforcement 
even more evident than in transactions within a single 
nation-state (e.g., the Soviet Union). As a result, 
provision of adequate governance structures for all 
international transactions may require an especially 
diverse and sophisticated range of institutions.
State and private opportunism in the international
system can take two forms: (1) reneging or cheating on
negotiated contractual trading agreements, and (2) the
establishment of barriers to trade (e.g., quotas, tariffs,
export controls). To control the level of opportunism in
the international trading system, transaction-cost analysis
posits that the establishment of institutional safeguards
is required between trading partners. Nonstandard
contractual arrangements consist of such mechanisms as
economic hostages, joint ventures, and licensing
agreements. Each has relevance to an understanding of
Soviet joint ventures with the West.
Nonstandard Contracting in Soviet-Western Economic and 
Political Relations: The Logic of Soviet Joint Ventures
with the West
The Soviet joint venture law of 1987 was the first 
authorization of such industrial cooperation between East 
and West in the Soviet Union since 1930. It was in 1930 
that Stalin cancelled all joint ventures with foreign 
countries on ideological grounds, claiming that such 
enterprises were inconsistent with Marxism-Leninism because
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they granted foreign control over vital sectors of the 
Soviet economy (Ross 1987).
Why did Gorbachev decide once again to allow Soviet 
joint ventures with Western firms within the geographical 
borders of the Soviet Union? By allowing joint ventures 
between Soviet enterprises and Western firms Gorbachev and 
his economic advisers hoped to gain three major economic 
benefits. First, they hope that joint ventures with the 
West can provide the Soviet Union with an additional source 
of investment capital. Second, Soviet officials hope that 
exports from joint ventures with will open new 
opportunities and markets for trade between the Soviet 
Union and the West. Finally, and perhaps most important, 
they hope joint ventures will provide a vehicle for 
absorbing advanced foreign technology and foreign 
management skills that, in turn, will help transform Soviet 
enterprises into economically efficient and internationally 
competitive units. (Bergson 1989:163-174; Lindsay 1989:60- 
65). Thus, the Soviet logic for engaging in the 
nonstandard contracting arrangement of joint ventures with 
the West is based on the Soviet concept that joint ventures 
are the most cost-effective (least amount of hard currency 
expenditure) and efficient means of acquiring and applying 
Western technology, business techniques, and internal 
organization to Soviet enterprises in a NEO-like 
environment.
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If, on the other hand, Western firms are to be induced 
to invest in the Soviet Union, thereby fulfilling the 
Soviet Union's desire to absorb foreign capital and its 
attendant benefits, the goals of Western investors must 
also be satisfied. The goals of Western firms to invest in 
the Soviet Union, and hence their interests, are 
straightforward. The foremost motivation for Western firms 
to invest in the Soviet Union has been to gain access, 
immediately or in the future, to what they perceive to be a 
huge domestic market, and to preempt competitors from 
gaining market share in the Soviet Union. Foreign 
investors are sensitive to their perception of the Soviet 
government's willingness to create a favorable environment 
for their long-run goals (Lindsay 1989:85). Western firms 
have, therefore, watched closely changes in the investment 
environment and have responded to concrete or perceived 
changes in it (Vestnik 1990). Potential investors have 
withheld investment when the environment has seemed to be 
poor, while extant investors have made their complaints 
known. Conversely, Western investors have entered joint 
venture projects when the environment improved.
The emphasis of transaction-cost analysis on 
institutions, contracts, economic and political conditions, 
rules, enforcement, and opportunism provides the framework 
for a truly systematic theory of international trade and 
cooperation that can explain the role of these factors in
facilitating or inhibiting not only East-West but West- 
West, North-South, East-South, and West-South economic and 
political relations. Employing a systematic framework is 
particularly important to the study of Soviet foreign 
economic policy and the IPE because Gorbachev has not made 
a secret of his interest in a growing role for the Soviet 
Union in the IPE, especially in Western organizations and 
arrangements such as GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank. At 
the same time, however, Gorbachev wants to guard against a 
repetition of past experiences in which economic ties with 
the West were allegedly exploited to bring political 
pressure on the Soviet Union (e.g., the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment). One way to avoid this problem is to raise the 
domestic political costs to Western governments while 
reducing economic costs to Western business firms, thus 
mixing international politics and international economics. 
Presumably the stronger the vested interest of Western 
business firms in the Soviet economy, the more difficult it 
will be for Western governments to politicize economic 
relations and to inhibit full Soviet integration into the 
IPE.
Internationally and domestically, economic and 
political agents, whether they be individual firms or 
sovereign states, must achieve economic and political 
cooperation in a world of uncertainty, bounded rationality, 
imperfect enforcement mechanisms, and opportunism.
However, the effect of these factors on a cooperative 
arrangement depends upon the attributes of the existing 
relationship between the agents. Therefore, as a preface 
to a transaction-cost analysis of Soviet joint ventures 
with the West, it is essential to understand the 
characteristics and the evolution of the primary 
transaction costs in Soviet-Western political economy.
SOVIET-WESTERN POLITICAL ECONOMY t 
THE EVOLUTION OF TRANSACTION COSTS
In a free market trade occurs when it is to the mutual 
advantage of the participants to engage in exchange. In 
international trade, participants exploit their comparative 
advantages in order to profit economically and sometimes 
politically. When compared to North-South or West-West 
trade, or when figured in volume and dollars, Soviet- 
Western trade is sometimes considered less important. 
Regarded as a matter related to international security and 
defense, however, its importance cannot be overlooked. 
Weighing recent changes in the government and economic 
system of the Soviet Union, continuing developments in the 
international control and transfer of technology and goods, 
and overtures made to the West by President Mikhail 
Gorbachev, conventional attitudes about the economic and 
political relations of Soviet-Western trade warrant 
reevaluation. Thus, before undertaking any analysis of 
Soviet joint ventures with the West and their political and
economic impact on Soviet-Western relations, it is 
necessary to examine first the basic characteristics and 
evolution of the primary transaction costs in Soviet- 
Western political economy which provides the basis for an 
analysis of Soviet joint ventures with the West. The 
primary transaction costs affecting Soviet-Western 
political economy that demand attention are (1) trade 
barriers, (2) problems related to monopsony market 
conditions, (3) the foreign exchange policy, and (4) risk 
and return. However, these transaction costs are not 
mutually exclusive and can produce various other 
transaction costs to economic and political agents in the 
Soviet-Western political economy.
Trade Barriers
If the benefits of a trading relationship are enjoyed 
predominantly by one of the partners, the other has the 
potential to use various trade barriers as a source of 
influence or leverage in seeking to obtain economic and 
noneconomic concessions and other valued outcomes. The 
behavior of target countries can be influenced by imposing 
opportunity costs and transaction costs on them. Trade 
barriers commonly take the form of restrictions on exports 
(tariffs), limits on imports (quotas), or impediments to 
the financial activities of the state (sanctions). Any 
actions or conditions that reduce the price received for
exports, or increase the price paid for imports, will tend 
to reduce the gains of trade. In cases of attempted 
leverage, the interruption of trade is usually involved to 
some degree (Mastanduno 1985:25). This is especially true 
in Soviet-Western trade as both the West and the Soviet 
Union have imposed policies that inhibit cooperation in the 
liberalization of Soviet-Western trade.
Western Trade Barriers: The desire to insure international
security has led to the imposition of formal controls on 
Western commerce with the Soviet Union, the Eastern 
European states, and the People's Republic of China. The 
United States and Japan, along with the members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), restrict trade, 
investment, and transfers of technology to these countries. 
These restrictions are administered primarily through the 
operation of an international regime known as the 
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls 
(COCOM). The primary purpose of COCOM is to integrate the 
efforts of its members to prevent the movement of strategic 
goods and technology to designated countries (Bertsch 
1988:11-12).
If trade barriers can be difficult to impose and 
maintain when attempted unilaterally, multilateral trade 
barriers are even more difficult to implement. A trade 
barrier may have as its goal a variety of objectives, but 
the use of trade barriers tends to reduce the gains from
trade (Mastanduno 1985:26-27). Because trade is a 
reciprocal activity, costs are also felt by the country 
that seeks to achieve its goals by imposing trade barriers. 
These can include the loss of profitable markets, or the 
loss of the advantages of economies of scale of production. 
Another loss is the stability that can result from 
increased interdependence and the political benefits of 
such stability (Bertsch 1988:19-20). Loss can be further 
experienced through the slowing of research and technical 
advances (Nau 1988).
Strategic trade barriers have often been a source of 
economic and political disagreement among the countries of 
the industrialized West. The conflict derives from 
divergent national opinions, perceptions, and objectives 
about the correct balance between economic and security 
interests, including the degree to which the trade barriers 
actually serve the collective economic and security needs 
of the West. This is increasingly problematic in a world 
market that is becoming more competitive as nation-states 
divide into well organized trading blocs (e.g., the 
European Community (EC) and the North American Trade 
Agreement between the United States and Canada). The 
industrialized West, newly industrialized countries (NICs), 
the Third World, the Soviet Union, and the Eastern European 
states are all currently seeking to expand their share of 
the world's wealth, which makes the specific character and
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nature of strategic trade barriers imposed by other 
governments critically important for their success or 
failure because of the opportunity costs and transaction 
costs involved in those barriers (Bertsch 1988:25-26).
This debate over the effectiveness and value of 
strategic trade barriers has led to the development of two 
fundamentally different points of view in the West 
regarding the proper management of Soviet-Western trade.
The first view regards the antagonistic aspects of the 
relationship between the Soviet Union, the United States, 
and their allies as the primary concern to be addressed in 
decisions about Soviet-Western trade. This viewpoint 
assumes that Soviet-Western trade benefits the Soviet Union 
disproportionately, and that trade will allow the Soviet 
Union the opportunity to redirect its resources away from 
consumer industries and toward military research and 
production. As a consequence, the West will be forced to 
increase its spending on defense in order to offset an 
increased Soviet military threat caused by trade and 
technology transfers (Cooper 1985; Mastanduno 1985:90-91; 
Wolf 1983:49). Therefore, the transaction costs of the 
Soviet-Western trading relationship are assumed to be too 
high to engage in full scale economic activity with the 
Soviet Union.
The second viewpoint assumes that the benefits of 
Soviet-Western trade accrue to the West. The ability of 
Western firms to open and compete for portions of the 
markets in the Soviet Union is seen as potentially 
profitable and beneficial in a variety of ways to Western 
economies. It is thought by proponents of this view that 
contacts made through Soviet-Western trade can bring about 
greater political stability through increased levels of 
economic cooperation and interdependence (Malish 1985; 
Mastanduno 1985:90). Therefore, this viewpoint assumes 
that the benefits of the Soviet-Western trading 
relationship are greater than the transaction costs 
involved in that relationship and in the long-run will 
reduce the level of transaction costs.
The position taken by the United States has generally 
been that the benefits of Soviet-Western trade accrue 
almost entirely to the Soviet Union. The United States has 
used its hegemonic position in the world, and in COCOM, to 
apply pressure to the Soviet Union through both 
multilateral and unilateral actions on a wide variety of 
political and economic issues, some of which have been 
essentially unrelated to narrowly conceived security 
concerns (e.g., MFN status for the Soviet Union) (Nau 
1988:77).
The European Community and Japan have often supported 
the opposing view. The economies of Western Europe and 
Japan are highly dependent upon trade as a source of 
national income, and they have favored more liberal 
policies in regard to Soviet-Western trade. This has 
caused the West to experience conflicting pressures 
regarding the most efficacious role for strategic trade 
barriers (e.g., export controls) and Western oriented 
international regimes. The West has experienced both a 
desire to promote liberal attitudes and integration in 
international trade in order to enhance economic stability, 
and the fear that a failure to constrain the interests of 
the Soviet Union through strategic trade barriers would 
have important negative consequences for Western security 
and economic interests (Bertsch 1988:26). Soviet joint 
ventures with the West have only increased these concerns 
because, by design, joint ventures are supposed to be an 
effective mechanism for the transfer of high technology and 
management know-how from the West to the Soviet Union. 
Soviet Trade Barriers: It is erroneous to assume that the
West has an exclusive monopoly on barriers to trade with 
the Soviet Union. Aslund (1989), Lindsay (1989), and 
McIntyre (1987) argue that a major barrier to Soviet- 
Western trade is the structure of the Soviet foreign trade 
system since it imposes controls on the export and import 
of energy, food, raw materials, and other products
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considered of strategic importance to the Soviet Union.
Historically, the guiding principle of the Soviet 
foreign trade system has been autarky or monopoly of 
foreign trade which gives the state absolute control over 
foreign economic policy (Hewett 1988B:287; Hough 1988:6). 
Until 1987, the Soviet foreign trade system operated in a 
manner originally created during the 1930s under Stalin.
The foreign trade organizations (FTO) established a 
monopoly over foreign trade by buying and selling goods in 
foreign currency and then selling to or buying from Soviet 
enterprises in domestic currency, which usually resulted in 
lower prices for producers of export goods. Industrial 
enterprises had no independent rights to export or import; 
the FTOs managed all details of import/export transactions, 
thereby keeping the enterprises from engaging in direct 
contact with foreign customers and participating in trade 
negotiations (Hewett 1988b:114-115).
In January 1987, a law entitled "Measures to Improve 
Management of Foreign Economic Relations" was enacted by 
the Soviet government in an effort to reduce the 
inefficiencies and barriers of international trade with the 
West intrinsic in the Soviet foreign trade system. The 
legislation originally granted authority to 21 ministries 
and 68 enterprises to trade directly with foreign markets. 
Enterprises can now negotiate the export terms for their 
products in order to obtain highest possible hard currency
earnings. Previously, an enterprise's exports and earnings 
were based on a system for the delivery of specified goods 
to meet the requirements of the plan set forth by GOSPLAN 
(Hough 1988:54-67). This reorganization of the Soviet 
foreign trade system was designed to provide greater 
incentives for Soviet enterprises to expand their export 
trade in order to make profits, which Soviet policymakers 
hoped would improve the quality of Soviet exports.
In January 1988, another phase of the reorganization 
of the Soviet foreign trade system was implemented. The 
Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT) and the State Foreign 
Economic Committee were merged into the Ministry for 
Foreign Economic Relations (MVES). The MVES was designed 
to provide strategic guidance to the foreign trade sector, 
but while the MFT and the State Foreign Economic Committee 
were abolished the MVES assumed the dominant role of 
monitoring the entire foreign trade system of the Soviet 
Union. However, the most recent reorganization of the 
Soviet foreign trade system appears to offer a measure of 
decentralization designed to eliminate barriers and 
facilitate trade with the West. The new Soviet Cabinet of 
Ministers has no Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, 
most FTOs are now being abolished, and individual firms are 
being given greater autonomy and responsibility in the area 
of foreign trade (CIA 1990:44-46).
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The Monopsony Problem
The basic problems presented by trading relations 
between market economies and nonmarket economies are those 
that neoclassical economists describe in their discussion 
of monopsony market relations. Specifically, these 
economists suggest that market failure occurs when there 
exists only one or a few buyers for particular products (a 
monopsony). In this relationship the sellers are seen as 
being somewhat at the mercy of the buyer. While ideal 
market conditions (e.g., many buyers and sellers, perfect 
information) might suggest a positive-sum growth for all 
parties to an exchange, the ability of a monopsony buyer to 
attain lower than competitive level prices from competing 
sellers has been the economic basis on which Western 
nation-states have denied the Soviet Union and its allies 
privileges that they currently accord each other (e.g., 
membership in GATT, the World Bank, and the IMF).
Although the existence of Soviet monopsony power has 
been disputed by some researchers, a more convincing 
argument can be made that even if monopsony power is weak 
at the present level of trade, this might not be the case 
if trade were to expand significantly. Critics of the 
existence of a monopsony argue that centrally planned 
economies, often being price insensitive and relatively 
small traders, tend also to be price takers rather than 
price fixers (Wolf 1983). In answering these criticisms it
can be argued that although the end users of a product
imported into a centrally planned economy may be price
insensitive, the appointed trade minister, by establishing
open bidding by Western firms, can easily become price
sensitive with respect to the purchase of foreign goods.
Vernon argues that although the Soviet Union and its allies
may be small traders in the current international trading
system, the challenge "is to devise a set of institutions
and procedures that is compatible with the growing volume
of East-West trade" (Vernon 1983:49). Vernon believes this
challenge includes having to deal with Soviet economic
power based on their monopsony position. He argues that
even with high technology items there are often competing
technologies and that:
. . . where such competition exists, the USSR appears 
to be in an excellent position to exploit the fact. 
First of all, few sellers to the Soviets are 
interested in making an isolated sale, however large 
that sale may be; most sellers are aware that firms 
with a prior record in the Soviet Union have an inside 
track for the future (1983:51).
In addition, Vernon suggests that the tendency for a
Western firm to want to achieve an "inside track" will be
extremely strong since sellers will attain this privileged
market position with respect to an entire economy and not
just part of it. Consequently, the temptation for Western
firms to cut prices during the initial bidding process will
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be "commensurately stronger" in their dealing with the 
Soviet Union than it would be in their dealings with other 
Western firms (Vernon 1983:51).
In the monopsony condition sellers are likely to 
practice price-cutting and become more competitively 
aggressive because of the ability of the large purchaser to 
drastically affect the seller's returns on investment. The 
negative effects of heightened competition are most 
apparent under three conditions, (1) when the seller's 
production capacity is subject to large economies of scale,
(2) when surplus capacity already exists in the market, and
(3) when the level of asset specificity in the seller's 
production function is high (Lindert 1986:178). This last 
condition occurs when a seller's capital investment is only 
profitable when long term sales guarantees have been 
achieved. Higher levels of competition among sellers occur 
as these three conditions come into play.
The analysis of the basic monopsonistic relationship 
between Western firms attempting to sell and a single (or 
few) buyers represented by socialist trade organizations 
and enterprises in the Soviet Union is complicated by 
Western government attempts to become involved on the part 
of individual sellers' interests in gaining lucrative 
contracts. These Western governments have two methods by 
which they can aid their national commercial interests with 
respect to a monopsonistic market. First, they can provide
subsidies in the forms of low cost credit or, more 
directly, through export subsidies. Both export subsidies 
and low cost credit have been used extensively by Western 
European countries to gain a competitive advantage over 
other foreign commercial interests in the Soviet-Western 
trade market. Second, market-oriented governments can 
develop cooperative relations of their own through an 
international regime to counteract the monopsonistic power 
of socialist trade ministries (e.g., GATT, COCOM) through 
the establishment of trade barriers (Crawford 1988). 
Therefore, trade between several Western firms and a single 
monopsonist trader in the Soviet Union will tend, by 
definition, to heighten the natural level of transaction 
costs since the existence of a monopsony implies small 
numbers bargaining at the very beginning of a trading 
relationship. Consequently, one would expect Western firms 
to encounter high levels of transaction costs as they 
attempt to insure they are not exploited and to avoid 
Western government controls that can hinder Western 
economic activity with the Soviet Union.
While the current reforms in the Soviet Union advocate 
the implementation of many aspects of a market economy, the 
monopsony problem still exists. The Wall Street Journal 
(September 12, 1990) reported that after the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, representatives of the Soviet 
petrochemical industry were acting as a monopsonistic power
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by causing intense competition among Western petrochemical 
firms negotiating joint ventures in this area.
Producer cooperatives, the right of Soviet enterprises 
to engage in foreign trade with external markets, and the 
increasing economic autonomy of the fifteen republics add 
to the complexity of the monopsony problem. In a regulated 
or planned market system, such as that advocated by 
Gorbachev, monopsony power shifts from the center in Moscow 
to the various producer cooperatives, enterprises, and 
republics. Until the Soviet Union implements a free market 
system many of the elements of a monopsonistic power will 
persist in the Soviet Union. This makes an understanding 
of the monopsony problem, even in the age of perestroika, 
essential for an analysis of Soviet joint ventures with the 
West and their economic and political impact on Soviet- 
Western trade and the IPE.
The Foreign Exchange Problem
A major stumbling block to significant increases in 
the volume and value of Soviet-Western trade has been the 
nonconvertibility of the ruble on international foreign 
exchange markets. Exchange rates are pivotal in 
international trade for two reasons: (l) they allow
participants in international trade to compare the prices 
of goods and services in different countries, and (2) trade 
transactions require that the currency of one country be
exchanged for the currency of the other country in order to 
pay for the goods and services purchased on international 
markets (Krugman and Obtsfeld 1988:307; Yarbrough and 
Yarbrough 1988:354). According to the theory of purchasing 
power parity (PPP) , in the long-run a country's foreign 
exchange rate on international foreign exchange markets is 
determined by the relative prices of goods and services 
within that country. The problem in the Soviet Union is 
that relative prices for goods and services do not reflect 
relative scarcity, which means setting an appropriate 
exchange rate for the ruble on international foreign 
exchange markets is problematic at this point (Hewett 1988; 
Zverev 1989).
Although the major industrialized countries, 
especially those in the West, have had free floating 
foreign exchange rates since 1973, the Soviet Union's 
official commercial exchange rate for the ruble remains 
fixed at $1.66. On the other hand, PLANECON (1989) 
estimates that the exchange rate for the ruble on the 
Soviet black market and in many international trade 
transactions to be approximately $.60. In December 1988, 
the Council of Ministers issued an edict entitled "On the 
Further Development of the External Economic Activity of 
State, Cooperative, and Other Public Enterprises, 
Associations, and Organizations." In it the Soviet Council 
of Ministers directed the Ministry of Finance to expand the
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foreign trade activities of Soviet firms, simplify trade 
regulations, and develop a plan for convertibility of the 
ruble. Soviet officials now believe that a convertible 
ruble is essential to encourage Western investment, expand 
Soviet-Western trade and technology transfers, and impose a 
market responsiveness on Soviet firms.
While the Soviets work to make the ruble a convertible 
currency they have attempted to developed temporary 
solutions to the foreign exchange problem in order to allow 
repatriation of profits by Western firms. First, a foreign 
exchange market is being created by the Soviet government 
in Moscow to allow Soviet and Western businesses to buy and 
sell foreign currency. The prices on this exchange market 
will reflect currency prices found on other international 
foreign exchange markets, but the Soviet market is limited 
to Soviet firms engaged in international trade or joint 
ventures. The Soviet government still plans to retain 
fixed exchange rates until 1993 for the domestic market 
under the "Gorbachev Plan" (New York Times. October 17,
1990). Second, the Soviets have created special exchange 
rates for approximately 2000 products by setting the 
exchange rates for equipment ($.50 - $1.00 per ruble) and 
raw materials ($2.00 and up per ruble). This aspect of the 
solution is designed to make a dollars worth of machinery 
sales worth more rubles than a dollars worth of raw 
materials so as to offset the inconsistencies of the
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unreformed price system caused by massive government 
subsidies (Hewett 1988a). Third, the foreign exchange 
problem in joint ventures (e.g., repatriation of profits) 
is being overcome through old-fashioned bartering. For 
example, Pepsico receives Russian vodka as its share of the 
profits in its joint venture arrangement, which it then 
sells on the world market for hard currency (Hardt 1989a).
Making the ruble a convertible currency on 
international foreign exchange markets would remove a major 
obstacle to Soviet integration into the IPE. The success 
of Soviet joint ventures and the future development of 
Soviet-Western trade requires that the Soviet Union make 
the ruble convertible in order to have a direct business 
connection with Western markets. However, ruble conversion 
may cause some unwanted transaction-costs for the Soviet 
Union. According to PPP, it is highly probable that a 
convertible ruble on international exchange markets would 
cause domestic price increases in the Soviet Union, which 
would increase the demand by Soviet consumers for imports 
and thereby dramatically reduce the value of the ruble. 
Thus, ruble conversion is a zero-sum game for Gorbachev 
because a convertible ruble would enhance the Soviet 
prospects in IPE but could hurt the governments image 
within the Soviet Union. On the other hand, maintaining a 
non-convertible ruble could potentially have the opposite 
effect.
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Risk and Return
Formal risk analysis begins by categorizing the 
various types of risks into a four-tier hierarchy. At the 
top of the hierarchy is country risk, which may be divided 
into two subcategories, (1) sovereign (or transfer) risk, 
which relates to government loans, and (2) country risk, 
which is a broader concept that encompasses the economic 
and political factors that affect the creditworthiness and 
opportunities of a nation-state (Goldstein and Vanous 1983; 
Merrill 1982). Macroeconomic risk is found on the second 
tier of the hierarchy. Macroeconomic risk "relates to 
specific macroeconomic factors including devaluations, 
recessions, and economic policy shifts that may impact the 
business within a nation" (Korbrin, Basek, Blank, La 
Palombara 1980). Industry risk and project risk, which 
deal with a specific product or investment opportunities, 
occupy tiers three and four of the hierarchy.
Uncontrollable risk factors are the most serious 
concern of Western firms involved in Soviet joint ventures. 
Korbrin, Basek, Blank, and La Palombara (1980) define 
uncontrollable risk factors as "those that are not amenable 
to alleviation by a firm's own strategic choices, although 
the firm's policies may guard against or limit damage from 
some forms of risk." Merrill (1982) further argues that 
most of the uncontrollable risks found in international 
business relate to country risk and macroeconomic risk
factors. In theory, country risk and macroeconomic risk 
are the most difficult to analyze because they usually 
involve more than two actors. For example, in a Soviet 
joint venture arrangement, country and macroeconomic risk 
analysis would involve the partners to the joint venture, 
the Soviet government, the Western firm's home government, 
and the other actors that make-up the IPE.
Goldstein and Vanous (1983) identify three factors 
that are essential to any Western firm's analysis of the 
risks of a business venture in the Soviet Union: (1)
Soviet trade strategy, (2) Soviet internal investment 
priorities and infrastructure development, and (3) Soviet 
macroeconomic policy. The current situation in the Soviet 
Union requires an additional factor to be added to any 
Western firm's risk analysis: Soviet political and social
stability. It is reasonable to assume that a Western firm 
would not want to invest heavily in a country where the 
potential exists for civil unrest or war even though that 
country offers the possibility of a lucrative market. The 
reason these factors are considered a requirement in 
Western firms' risk analysis of the Soviet Union is because 
they indicate the specific opportunities, strategies, and 
transaction costs to which Western firms should be 
cognizant.
Bergson (1989), Hewett (1988b), and Lindsay (1989) 
assert that Soviet trade strategy is a vital component of 
Gorbachev's transition to a controlled market economy, thus 
making assessment of Soviet trade an important factor in 
estimating long-run Soviet economic prospects. The key 
element for Western firms analyzing Soviet trade strategy 
is calculating whether the Soviet Union is moving from an 
import-substitution development strategy to an export 
promotion development strategy. Yarbrough and Yarbrough 
(1988:302) state that the major indicators of a transition 
from import substitution to export promotion are growth of 
export value and volume, increased industrial 
competitiveness, and reductions in the degree of effective 
protection. Tedstrom (1990) argues that while export 
indicators are moving marginally upward, increased 
industrial competition and reduced protectionism have not 
fully materialized in the Soviet Union.
Soviet internal investment priorities and 
infrastructure development is the second key factor of 
Western firms' risk analysis of the Soviet Union.
Goldstein and Vanous (1983) identify several warning signs 
in assessing this risk factor: (1) a preference for large,
prestigious projects over basic infrastructure, (2) lean 
distribution of investment resources across various 
projects, (3) reliance on imported capital for major 
projects, and (4) subsidized inputs. In June 1989, former
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Prime Minister Ryzhkov reported that the Soviet Union was
severely undercapitalized and that the problem was
exacerbated by a poor track record for job completion and
the tendency to overextend resources across projects (FBIS-
SOV, June 8, 1989). Solutions to the problem of
undercapitalization are needed in order for the Soviet
Union to increase its productivity, thus making its economy
more competitive in the IPE and more attractive to foreign
investors due to lower transaction costs (e.g., capital
investment on the part of the Western firm).
Michael Porter (1990) and Beth and Robert Yarbrough
(1988) argue that one of the most important elements of
maintaining an attractive international business
environment is the implementation of solid and competent
macroeconomic policy (particularly fiscal policy) by a
nation-state. Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1988:433) state:
A nation that is vulnerable to poor fiscal management 
may be a poorer risk from the foreign partner's 
viewpoint for several reasons. First, it increases 
the chances of recession or lengthy economic 
stagnation. Second, inflation risks are higher and 
inflation may be more severe. This, in turn, upsets 
cost forecasts and if exchange rates are fixed, could 
impair export profitability.
Lindsay (1989:107) suggests that the Soviet Union has been
very susceptible to poor macroeconomic management because
of the inherent nature of the central planning system and
the massive subsidies the government provides to industry
and agriculture. V.K. Senchagov, Chairman of GOSTSEN
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(State Committee for Prices), estimated Soviet subsidies to 
be approximately 130 billion rubles annually (FBIS-SOV, 
August 23,1989).
CONCLUSION: THE TRANSACTION COSTS OF SOVIET-WESTERN
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Despite pronouncements of the end of the Cold War and 
the emergence of a "new world order," transaction costs are 
ever present in Soviet-Western political economy due to the 
uncertainty, bounded rationality, and legal complications 
for Western firms doing business in the Soviet Union. 
Western and Soviet trade barriers, primarily in the form of 
export controls, force a prospective Western partner in a 
Soviet joint venture into a marginal acceptability of risk. 
The risk involves the possibility that the Western 
partner's export or import licenses may not be renewed by 
its home government or the Soviet government. This 
compromises a Western firm's investment in a Soviet joint 
venture, resulting in lost revenue and surplus capacity for 
the joint venture's final product.
The foreign exchange problem illustrates the financial 
and economic transaction costs a Western firm may encounter 
in a Soviet joint venture. Financial and economic 
transaction costs are primarily the result of the pricing 
system of the Soviet command economy. A government 
regulated price system prevents the functioning of a market 
based on supply and demand. This results in problems of
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(1) cost calculations, (2) valuation of investment by
Western partners, (3) foreign currency controls, (4)
repatriation of profits, and (5) payment guarantees to
Western firms (Hardt 1989b:49). In addition, taut planning
by GOSPLAN produces chronic shortages of raw materials,
machines, energy, and other primary inputs, forcing Western
firms to import these inputs for production thereby
increasing the level of capital investment on the part of
the Western firms.
The monopsonistic power of the various government and
business entities in the Soviet Union increases the risk
and legal transaction costs of Western firms doing business
in the Soviet Union. John Hardt (1989b:49) explains:
Relatively new and fluid Soviet joint venture 
legislation increases business risk. Of particular 
interest to business are questions of balancing 
accounts, foreign currency valuation, and insurance.
In addition, basic concerns such as domestic handling 
of compensation and a mechanism for arbitration must 
still be negotiated. The absence of protection in a 
wide-range of areas hampers trade by 
disproportionately increasing the initial costs and 
risks involved. These risks among other, include the 
absence of (1) an investment protection treaty, (2) 
product promotion contract, and (3) protection for 
business and production secrets, patents, trademarks, 
and copyrights.
The current political, social, and economic 
instability in the Soviet Union also increases the legal 
transaction costs of Western firms doing business in the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet system under Gorbachev appears to 
be in a very tenuous position with the pressure for 
economic and political autonomy by the Soviet republics
increasing and the tide of social unrest stimulated 
primarily by the failure of the Soviet economy to meet the 
needs of the Soviet people rising. A change in the Soviet 
government may produce a change in Soviet laws concerning 
foreign investment that could be to the benefit or 
detriment of Western firms currently doing business in the 
Soviet Union depending upon who assumed power.
Despite the nature of Soviet-Western political 
economy, Western firms have traditionally regarded the 
Soviet Union as at least an average but somewhat 
problematic risk. But considering the current Soviet 
political and economic crisis and the evolving changes and 
instabilities, questions emerge regarding what factors are 
considered by a Western firm when it decides to engage or 
not engage in a Soviet joint venture project. Is it the 
Soviet political climate? Is it Soviet government policy? 
Is it Western government policy? Is it the international 
business environment? Is it the overall reduction of the 
transaction costs that have traditionally been involved in 
Soviet-Western political economy? This study will now 
focus on answering these questions in light of the 
continuing changes within the Soviet Union.
CHAPTER 4
A TRANSACTION-COST ANALYSIS OF SOVIET JOINT 
VENTURES WITH THE WEST
Soviet joint ventures with the West are considered 
the cornerstone of Gorbachev's foreign economic policy as 
he attempts to reorganize the Soviet foreign trade system 
and to fully integrate the Soviet Union into the IPE.
That fact underscored the need to understand the factors 
that contribute to the establishment of Western joint 
ventures in the Soviet Union. This chapter develops a 
model of Soviet joint ventures with the West that permits 
an empirical test of whether transaction costs directly or 
indirectly affect Western business firms' decisions to 
engage or not engage in a joint venture project. The 
analysis will make it possible to determine (1) if the 
decision by Western firms to engage in Soviet joint 
ventures is the direct or indirect result of the reduction 
of the transaction costs involved in Soviet-Western 
political and economic relations brought about by the 
implementation of the Soviet joint venture law, and (2) if 
the reduction is sufficient to encourage joint ventures to 
become a mechanism of greater cooperation in Soviet-Western 
political economy.
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Survey Data
The data analyzed are responses by Western firms 
involved and not involved in Soviet joint ventures to the 
surveys found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. The survey in 
Appendix 1, "Questionnaire: Firms Involved in Joint
Ventures with the Soviet Union," was sent to 1,274 Western 
firms officially registered with the Soviet Union's 
Ministry of Finance as of April 1, 1990. The survey in 
Appendix 2, "Questionnaire: Firms Not Involved in Soviet
Joint Ventures But Doing Business with the Soviet Union," 
was sent to 350 Western firms that are not engaged in 
Soviet joint ventures but are currently engaged in other 
business and economic arrangements in the Soviet Union 
(e.g., co-production, licensing agreements). The Western 
firms in the control group were identified by Fortune. 
Interflo. and Vestnik.
Replies were received from 431 of the 1,274 Western 
firms involved in joint ventures, a 34 percent rate of 
return. Three hundred forty-six (346) (80 percent of those
firms that responded) answered the questionnaire while 85 
(20 percent of those firms that responded) stated that 
company policy prohibited responses to inquires of this 
nature. Correspondingly, 227 replies were received from 
the 350 Western firms not involved in joint ventures, a 65
percent rate of return. Of those Western firms not 
involved in Soviet joint ventures but doing business in the 
Soviet Union, 172 (76 percent of those firms that 
responded) answered the questionnaire while 55 (24 percent 
of those firms that responded) stated that company policy 
prohibited responses to inquiries of this nature. The 
higher overall rate of return for firms not involved in 
joint ventures may best be explained by the fact that all 
the firms in this group were located in the United States 
and Canada. On the other hand, firms involved in joint 
ventures were located in the United States, Canada,
Germany, Great Britain, Australia, Japan, France, Finland, 
Ireland, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, 
and Lichtenstein (see Table 1). The data in Table 1 
indicate that the majority of the firms involved in joint 
ventures (approximately 57 percent) were located in the 
United States and Canada. Therefore, the two groups are 
made up predominantly of Western firms from these two North 
American countries. This probably means that the business 
practices and attitudes of both groups, while not 
identical, should be similar in nature.
Another similarity between the two groups is the 
location of their Soviet business activity. Two hundred- 
eighty five, or 82 percent, of Western firms involved in 
Soviet joint ventures conduct business in the Russian 
Republic, and 136, or 80 percent of the Western firms not
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TABLE is NO SJV AND SJV BY HOME COUNTRY
HOME COUNTRY No SJV SJV
United States 131 115
Canada 41 81
Great Britain - 41
Japan - 39
Germany - 29
France - 13
Italy - 9
Australia - 7
Sweden - 3
The Netherlands - 3
Spain - 2
Belgium - 2
Ireland - 1
Lichtenstein 1
TOTAL 172 346
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involved in joint ventures. In addition, 12 percent (42 
Western firms) of the firms involved in joint ventures 
conduct business in the Baltic republics, while 11 percent 
(19 Western firms) of the firms not involved in joint 
ventures conduct business in the Baltic republics (see 
Table 2). Since the Russian Republic and the Baltic 
republics account for the vast majority of the Soviet gross 
national product (GNP) these findings are not surprising.
In general, it appears that Western firms are conducting 
business in the most economically important and productive 
republics of the Soviet Union.
Survey respondents were queried regarding the area of 
industry in which they primarily conducted business in the 
Soviet Union. The summary in Table 3 shows that 46 percent 
of the Western firms engaged in Soviet joint ventures are 
involved in the service industry (hotels, tourism, etc.) 
and the production of consumers products (e.g., personal 
hygiene items). Fifthteen percent of the Soviet joint 
ventures are in the medical field, particularly in the area 
of medical supplies. On the other hand, the industry 
breakdown for Western firms not involved in joint ventures 
is quite different. Seventy-five percent of the firms not 
involved in joint ventures conduct business primarily 
within three areas of industry in the Soviet Union: (1)
chemical, (2) energy (oil, gas, etc.), and (3) 
machinery/heavy machinery industry. Sarah Carey (1991)
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TABLE 2: LOCATION OF WESTERN FIRMS IN THE SOVIET UNION
BY NO SJV AND SJV
REPUBLIC NO SJV SJV
Russia 136 285
Estonia 9 17
Lithuania 7 12
Latvia 3 13
Ukraine 7 11
Georgia 6 7
Belorussia 3 1
Armenia 1 0
Uzbekistan 0 0
Azerbaijan 0 0
Molvavia 0 0
Kazakhistan 0 0
Kirghizia 0 0
Turkmenistan 0 0
Tadzhikistan 0 0
TOTAL 172 346
explains that before June 1990 Western firms in the 
chemical, energy, and machinery industries were very 
hesitant to engage in a legal entity (joint venture) in the 
Soviet Union because of the ambiguity of the joint venture 
law itself, particularly questions regarding ownership, 
management, and access to resources. Table 3 also presents 
an industry breakdown for those firms in each group that 
did not respond to the survey. This information increases 
the reliability of the study by showing that the firms 
responding to the survey are a representative sample when 
compared to those firms that did not respond. Carey (1991) 
further notes that joint ventures in the Soviet Union in 
these areas are increasing because of the Presidential 
Decree issued in October 1990 authorizing 100 percent 
foreign ownership of joint ventures and other business 
forms. This decree is suppose to grant greater managerial 
control and access to resources for Western firms 
conducting business in the Soviet Union.
Some significant differences appear to exist between 
Western firms involved in joint ventures and those firms 
not involved in joint ventures with respect to the market 
destination of their final products. As can be seen in 
in Table 4, 28 percent of the firms involved in joint 
ventures state that the Soviet domestic market is their 
product's final destination, while 56 percent of the firms 
not involved in joint ventures target the Soviet domestic
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TABLE 3: AREA OF INDUSTRY OF WESTERN FIRMS IN THE USSR
AREA OF INDUSTRY
R
NO SJV
NR 
NO SJV
R
SJV
NR
SJV
Chemical 22% 20% 5% 4%
Energy 18% 17% 8% 5%
Computers/Electronics 8% 7% 8% 11%
Food 0% 4% 3% 5%
Service (hotels, tourism, 
etc.) 0% 5% 24% 34%
Machinery/Heavy Industry 35% 23% 9% 8%
Consumer Products 4% 2% 22% 11%
Agriculture 11% 14% 4% 13%
Medical 2% 6% 15% 5%
Telecommunications 0% 2% 8% 4%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
n=172 n=178 n=346 n=928
NR=Did Not Respond to Survey R=Did Respond to Survey
TABLE 4: FINAL MARKET DESTINATION
BY NO SJV AND SJV
Market Destination NOT SJV________ SJV
Soviet Domestic 56% 28%
Home Domestic 15% 12%
World_______________________ 29%__________60%
TOTAL 100% 100%
n=172 n=346
market. On the other hand, Western firms involved in 
Soviet joint ventures appear to be targeting the world 
market as the final destination of their products (61 
percent compared to 29 percent for Western firms not 
involved in Soviet joint ventures). The reason for this 
difference in the two groups may be easily explained.
Since 25 percent of the joint venture firms are found in 
the service industry (e.g., hotels, tourism, etc.), it is 
probable that they view Western business people and 
tourists as their primary market. While this area of 
industry brings hard currency to the Soviet economy it 
should not be given the same weight as oil, chemicals, and 
heavy machinery as similar exports that are included in the 
Soviet Union's balance-of-payments. Removing the service 
industry reduces the percentage from 61 to 37 for targeting 
the world market by Western firms involved in Soviet joint 
ventures.
One factor common to the two groups of firms concerns 
the Soviet political climate. Both were asked what would 
have to occur for them to end all business relations in the 
Soviet Union (Questions 35 and 34 in Appendix 1 and 2 
respectively). Table 5 shows that 80 percent of both firms 
involved and not involved in joint ventures would seriously 
reconsider their business activity in the Soviet
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Union if civil war should erupt. Western firms fear losing 
their investment and any potential revenues because civil 
war would cause economic and political chaos.
The other questions addressed in the survey (not used 
in the analysis in the next section) show little variation 
between firms involved and not involved in joint ventures. 
This is further demonstrated by miscellaneous comments 
received from survey respondents in both groups. For 
example, the biggest surprise of doing business in the 
Soviet Union cited by survey respondents in both groups was 
the cooperation and willingness to work exhibited by their 
Soviet co-workers. In addition, a majority of the survey 
respondents from both groups stated that the one thing they 
would do if they had the opportunity to renegotiate with 
the Soviet Union would be to seek either more control or 
complete ownership of the operation. Further analysis of 
the data will demonstrate that Western firms are willing to 
conduct business in the Soviet Union, even under diverse 
circumstances as the unstable Soviet political climate.
The success of Western firms doing business in the Soviet 
Union can only contribute to cooperation in the 
liberalization of Soviet-Western political economy and the 
complete integration of the Soviet Union in the IPE.
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TABLE 5: EVENTS IN THE USSR THAT WOULD CAUSE WESTERN
FIRMS TO RECONSIDER DOING BUSINESS IN 
THE SOVIET UNION
Event_________________NOT SJV____________ SJV
Secession of the
Republics 4% 5%
The ouster of
President Gorbachev 16% 15%
Civil War in
the Soviet Union________ 80%______________ 80%
TOTAL 100%
n=172
100%
n=346
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Model and Methodology
The transaction cost analysis of Soviet-Western joint 
ventures with the West employed in this study is based on 
the information collected from the surveys found in 
Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. As previously noted, specific 
questions from the surveys were identified, treated as 
Likert scale items, and coded into a data set in order to 
test the following model and research hypothesis (see Table 
6 for precise coding of the data):
Model: SJV = a + b^TAC) + b2(INTBUS) + b3 (SOVPOL)
+ b4(WESTPOL) + b5(SOP) + e
SJV: The Western firm's decision to engage or not
engage in a joint venture in the Soviet 
Union.
TAC: The Western firm's perception of the level
of transaction costs that may be incurred 
by engaging in a Soviet joint venture.
INTBUS: The Western firm's perception of the level
of business and strategic planning risks 
involved in engaging or not engaging in 
a Soviet joint venture.
SOVPOL: The Western firm's perception of the Soviet
political climate.
SOP: The Western firm's perception of the impact
of Soviet government policy on their 
decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet 
joint venture.
WESTPOL: The Western firm's perception of the impact
of Western government policy on their 
decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet 
joint venture.
Research Hypothesis: The decision by Western firms to
engage in Soviet joint ventures is the direct or 
indirect result of the reduction of the transaction 
costs involved in Soviet-Western political economy.
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TABLE 6: SOVIET JOINT VENTURE MODEL VARIABLES
ACRONYM SURVEY QUESTION AND CODING SCHEME________
SJV Question 3, Appendix 1 and 2
Has firm entered into a joint venture?
The question was coded in the following 
manner:
0 = No 1 = Yes
TAC TAC is a composite variable created from
the following survey questions:
Question 13, Appendix 1 
Question 8, Appendix 2
Importance of following factors in Western 
firm's decision to engage or not engage 
in a Soviet joint venture.
TAC1: Capital Investment
TAC2: Soviet Legal Barriers 
TAC3: Governance and Maintenance
TAC4: Information
These factors were coded in the 
following manner:
1 = Very Important
2 = Somewhat Important
3 = Not Important
TAC5: Question 24, Appendix 1 
Question 19, Appendix 2
Type of technology required for joint venture 
or business activity. TAC5 was coded in the 
following manner:
1 = Transaction-Specific Technology
2 = General Purpose Technology
TAC6: Question 24, Appendix 1
Question 22, Appendix 2
The effect of firm's joint venture or business 
contractual agreement on the costs of 
information. TAC6 was coded in the following 
manner:
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ACRONYM
TABLE 6
SURVEY QUESTION AND CODING SCHEME
1 = Very ambiguous and substantially increases
the opportunity for the strategic use of 
information.
2 = Somewhat ambiguous and provides minimal
opportunity for the strategic use of 
information.
2 = Uncertain
2 = Somewhat limits and reduces the strategic
use and costs of information.
3 = Greatly limits and reduces the strategic
use and costs of information.
TAC7: Question 29, Appendix 1
Question 24, Appendix 2
The effect of mechanisms in joint venture and 
business activity arrangements on the potential 
for opportunism and defection. TAC7 was coded 
in the following manner:
1 = Greatly increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
2 = Somewhat increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
2 = Uncertain.
2 = Somewhat reduces the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
3 = Greatly reduces the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
TAC = TAC1 + TAC2 + TAC3 + TAC4 + TAC5 +
TAC6 + TAC7
The composite TAC score was grouped into three 
categories (High = 0 to 7), (Average = 8 to 13) , 
and (Low = 14 to 20).
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ACRONYM
INTBUS
TABLE 6
SURVEY QUESTION AND CODING SCHEME
INTBUS is a composite variable created from 
the following questions:
INTBUS1: Question 15, Appendix 1
Question 10, Appendix 2
How much marketing effort is required to sell 
products in the Soviet Union? INTBUS1 was 
recoded in the following manner:
1 = Much more than average customer.
2 = Initial sales require more marketing effort,
but repeat sales do not.
2 = Not sure.
3 = Level of required marketing is about
the same.
3 = Less expensive than for most foreign 
customers.
INTBUS2: Question 16, Appendix 1
Question 11, Appendix 2
How reliable are the Soviets in complying 
with contract agreements? INTBUS2 was 
recoded in the following manner:
1 = Never meets agreements.
2 = Sometimes does not meet agreements.
2 = Uncertain.
3 = Meets agreements, but exploits loopholes.
3 = Very reliable.
INTBUS3: Question 20, Appendix 1 
Question 15, Appendix 2
What is the estimated initial capital investment 
for your firm's joint venture or business 
activity in the Soviet Union? INTBUS3 was 
recoded in the following manner:
TABLE 6
ACRONYM
SOVPOL
SURVEY QUESTION AND CODING SCHEME 
1 = Over $30 million
1 = $20 - 29 million
2 = $10 - 19 million 
2 = $1 - 9 million
2 = $500,000 - 1 million
3 = $100,000 - 500,000 
3 = Under $100,000
INTBUS = INTBUS1 + INTBUS2 + INTBUS3 
The composite INTBUS was grouped into three 
categories (High = 0 to 3), (Average = 4 to 
6) , and (Low = 7  to 9).
Question 34, Appendix 1
Question 32, Appendix 2
How would your firm describe the current
political climate in the Soviet Union?
The question was coded in the following 
manner:
1 = Very stable.
2 = Somewhat stable.
3 = Somewhat unstable.
4 = Very Unstable.
TABLE 6
ACRONYM
SOP
WESTPOL
SURVEY QUESTION AND CODING SCHEME
Question 33, Appendix 1 and 2 
How would your firm describe the impact of 
Soviet government policy on your firm's 
decision to engage or not engage in a 
joint venture? The question was coded 
in the following manner.
1 = Greatly limits.
2 = Somewhat limits.
3 = Somewhat promotes.
4 = Greatly promotes.
Question 26, Appendix 1 
Question 21, Appendix 2
How would your firm describe the impact of 
Western government policy on your firm's 
decision to engage or not engage in a 
Soviet joint venture? The question was 
coded in the following manner:
1 = Greatly limits.
2 = Somewhat limits.
3 = Somewhat promotes.
4 = Greatly promotes.
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In order to test both the relative contribution of the 
variables described above and their predictive power in a 
multivariate context, logistic regression will be employed 
with the decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet joint 
venture (SJV) as the dependent variable and TAC, INTBUS, 
SOVPOL, SOP, and WESTPOL as the independent variables.
Conceptualization of Model Variables
Dependent Variable; The dependent variable for the Soviet 
joint venture model is the Western firm's decision to 
engage or not engage in a joint venture project in the 
Soviet Union (SJV). The model suggests that the decision 
by a Western firm on participation in a Soviet joint 
venture is influenced by the variables TAC, INTBUS,
WESTPOL, SOP, and SOVPOL. The variable SJV is based upon 
responses by Western firms to the following question: "Has
your firm entered into a joint venture agreement with a 
firm in the Soviet Union?" (Question 3 on both surveys - 
see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2).
Independent Variables: The first independent variable in
the Soviet joint venture model is TAC. TAC is a composite 
variable based upon the Western firm's perception of the 
level of transaction costs that may be incurred if the 
Western firm decides to engage in a Soviet joint venture. 
TAC is measured on an ordinal scale (l=high, 2=average, 
3=low) based on responses to survey questions by both
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Western firms engaged in Soviet joint ventures and those 
Western firms not engage in Soviet joint venture (Questions 
13, 24, 27, and 29 in Appendix 1 for Western firms engaged 
in Soviet joint ventures, and Questions 8, 19, 22, and 24 
in Appendix 2 for Western firms not engaged in Soviet joint 
ventures). Table 7 shows the frequency distribution for 
TAC. While not identical, the index for both groups are 
similar in that they attempt to measure such things as the 
level of capital investment, available information, legal 
and contractual barriers, governance and maintenance of the 
business relationship, and asset specificity.
In keeping with the theoretical assumptions of NEO and 
transaction-cost analysis presented in Chapter 3, TAC was 
composed based upon the researcher's classification of 
survey responses to the aforementioned questions according 
to TAC's coding scheme (l=high, 2=average, 3=low).
Responses for both Western firms involved in Soviet joint 
ventures and Western firms not involved in Soviet joint 
ventures were classified in the same manner. For Question 
13 in Appendix 1 and Question 8 in Appendix 2, capital 
investment, information, Soviet legal barriers, and 
governance and maintenance of the Soviet business 
relationship were used to compose TAC. If the survey 
respondents stated that either of these transaction cost 
factors were "very important" to their business 
relationship in the Soviet Union TAC was coded 1 (high), if
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"somewhat important" TAC was coded 2 (average), and if "not 
important" TAC was coded 1 (low).
Question 24 in Appendix 1 and Question 19 in Appendix 
2 measured the level of asset specificity by asking survey 
respondents if their business activity in the Soviet Union 
required general purpose (standardized) technology or 
transaction-specific technology. If a respondent answered 
general purpose technology TAC was coded 3 (low), and if a 
respondent answered transaction-specific technology TAC was 
coded 1 (high). This is in keeping with Oliver 
Williamson's (1986:17) argument that transaction-specific 
technology or asset specificity results in a high level of 
transaction costs because the technology is idiosyncratic 
to a particular business relationship, the loss of this 
relationship would therefore result in significant excess 
capacity and other associated losses.
The level of transaction costs incurred from the 
available information to Western firms in their business 
relationship in the Soviet Union was measured based upon 
survey responses to Question 27 in Appendix 1 and Question 
22 in Appendix 2. If respondents stated that their 
business relationship "greatly limits and reduces . . . the 
strategic use and costs of information" TAC was coded 3 
(low). A "somewhat" or "uncertain" response resulted in 
TAC being coded 2 (average). TAC was coded 1 (high) if 
respondents stated that their business relationship in the
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Soviet Union could result in the strategic use of 
information or lead to opportunism by one of the partners 
to the contractual agreement.
The last element of TAC is based upon survey responses 
to Question 29 in Appendix 1 and Question 24 in Appendix 2. 
These questions measure the Western firms' perceived level 
of transaction costs involved in the maintenance and 
governance of the Western firm's business relationship in 
the Soviet Union and if that relationship provides a 
mechanism for opportunism. If respondents stated that 
their business form "greatly reduces the costs and the 
potential for opportunism and defection," TAC was coded 3 
(low). A "somewhat reduces" or "uncertain" response to the 
survey questions resulted in TAC being coded 2 (average). 
TAC was coded 1 (high) if survey respondents stated that 
the governance and maintenance of their business form in 
the Soviet Union "somewhat" or "greatly" increased the 
potential for opportunism and defection."
Based upon the theoretical arguments presented in 
Chapter 3, a strong relationship should exist between TAC 
and SJV. If the Western firm's perceived level of TAC is 
high then it is expected that the Western firm will be less 
likely to decide to engage in a Soviet joint venture. On 
the other hand, it is expected that if the Western firm's 
perceived level of TAC is average or low, the Western firm 
will be more likely to decide to engage in a Soviet joint
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venture. Table 8 shows that there exists a strong 
relationship in the expected direction between SJV and TAC, 
TAC is average (2) or low (3) for 67 percent of those 
Western firms involved in Soviet joint ventures.
Conversely, only 28 percent of those firms not involved in 
Soviet joint ventures perceived TAC as being low, while 
approximately 33 percent of the control group perceived TAC 
as being high.
The second independent variable in the Soviet joint 
venture model is INTBUS. INTBUS is the Western firm's 
perception of the level of the business and strategic 
planning risks involved in the decision to engage or not 
engage in a Soviet joint venture. INTBUS includes such 
factors as marketing, Soviet contract reliability, and 
capital investment requirements. INTBUS is measured on an 
ordinal scale (l=high, 2=average, 3=low) based on responses 
to the survey questions by both Western firms engaged in 
Soviet joint ventures (Questions 15, 16, and 20 in Appendix 
1) and Western firms not engaged in Soviet joint ventures 
(Questions 10, 11, and 15 in Appendix 2). Table 9 shows 
the frequency distribution for INTBUS.
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TABLE 7: FREQUENCY TABLE FOR TAC
TAC FREOUENCY PERCENT
CUMULATIVE
FREOUENCY
CUMULATIVE
PERCENT
1-High 170 32.8 170 32.8
2-Aver 165 31.9 335 64.9
3-Low 183 35.3 518 100.0
TABLE 8: SOVIET JOINT VENTURES BY TRANSACTION COSTS
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF TRANSACTION COSTS
SJV HIGH AVERAGE LOW TOTAL
0 (NO) 56 68 48 172
(10.8%) (13.1) (9.3%) (33.2%)
1 (YES) 114 97 135 346
(22.0%) (18.7%) (26.1%) (66.8%)
TOTAL 170 165 183 518
(32.8%) (31.8%) (35.4%) (100%)
X 2 = 8.79 prob. = .012 gamma = .107
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TABLE 9: FREQUENCY TABLE FOR INTBUS
CUMULATIVE CUMULATIVE 
INTBUS____ FREOUENCY____ PERCENT____ FREOUENCY____ PERCENT
1-High 143 28.8 149 28.8
2-Aver 188 36.3 331 61.6
3-Low 187 36.1 518 100.0
INTBUS is based on survey responses to the 
aforementioned questions using the coding scheme l=high, 
2=average, 3=low. Question 15 in Appendix 1 and Question 
10 in Appendix 2 measured the marketing level required by 
Western firms to sell products or services in the Soviet 
Union. If the survey firms stated that their marketing 
effort required "much more than average foreign customer" 
INTBUS was coded 1 (high). A response of "initial sales 
require more marketing effort, but repeat sales do not" or 
"not sure" resulted in INTBUS being coded 2 (average). 
INTBUS was coded 3 (low) if survey firms stated the level 
of required marketing was the same or "less expensive than 
for most foreign customers." The same criteria was applied 
to Question 16 in Appendix 1 and Question 11 in Appendix 2. 
INTBUS was coded 1 (high) if firms checked number 5 on 
Questions 16 and 11, coded 2 (average) if they selected 
response items 3 or 4, and coded 3 (low) if they selected 
response items 1 or 2.
Question 20 in Appendix 1 and Question 15 in Appendix 
2 measured the estimated level of capital investment 
initially invested by Western firms involved in Soviet 
joint ventures and Western firms not involved in Soviet 
joint ventures. INTBUS was coded 1 (high) if firms 
selected response items 1 or 2, coded 2 (average) if they 
selected response items 3, 4, or 5, and coded 3 (low) if 
response items 6 or 7 were selected. The coding of INTBUS
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is based on (1) the traditional motivations for direct 
foreign investment found in any basic international 
economics textbook (see Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1988), and 
(2) the arguments presented in the "Risk and Return" 
section of Chapter 3.
The relationship between SJV and INTBUS is expected to 
be similar to the relationship between SJV and TAC. If the 
Western firm's perception of INTBUS is high, the Western 
firm is less likely to engage in a Soviet joint venture and 
more likely to engage in a Soviet joint venture if INTBUS 
is average or low (see Table 10). Thus the hypothesis 
still shows a strong bivariate relationship in the expected 
relationship (x2 = 11.438, P < 05, gamma = .252). In 
addition, it is expected that the perceived level of TAC is 
highly correlated with the perceived level of INTBUS. The 
expected relationship is strongly supported by the 
bivariate regression analysis presented in Table 10 (F- 
value of 1076.5 (prob = .0001) and a R2 of .68.
The third independent variable in the Soviet joint 
venture model is SOVPOL. SOVPOL is the Western firm's 
perception of the Soviet political climate. SOVPOL is 
measured on a four point scale (l=very stable, 2=somewhat 
stable, 3=somewhat unstable, 4=very unstable) based upon 
Western firms' responses to survey Question 34 in Appendix 
1 and survey Question 32 in Appendix 2. Table 12 shows the 
frequency distribution for SOVPOL.
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TABLE 10:: SOVIET JOINT VENTURES BY INTBUS
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF INTBUS
SJV HIGH AVERAGE LOW TOTAL
0 (NO) 62 62 48 172
(12.0%) (12.0%) (9.3%) (33.3%)
1 (YES) 81 126 139 346
(15.6%) (24.3%} (26.8) (66.1%)
TOTAL 143 188 187 518
(27.6%) (36.3%) (36.1%) (100%)
X2 = 11.438 prob. = .003 gamma = .252
TABLE 11: BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS:
EFFECT OF TAC ON INTBUS
Dependent Variable: INTBUS
Independent
Variable Coefficient S.E. T-Ratio
Constant .48 .05
TAC .79 .02 32.81*
Number of Cases 518
R2 .68
Adjusted R2 .68
F-Value 1076.57**
*P < Significant at .05 level (.0001)
**p < Significant at .05 level (.0001)
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The Soviet joint venture model presented in Appendix 3 
shows that SOVPOL affects TAC, INTBUS, and SJV. The 
relationships between SOVPOL and TAC and INTBUS is expected 
to be similar. If the perceived level of SOVPOL is 3 or 4 
then TAC and INTBUS are expected to be high, but if SOVPOL 
is 1 or 2 then TAC and INTBUS should be average or low. 
Crosstabulations of the survey sample (both SJV and NO SJV) 
presented in Tables 13 and 14 show that the relationships 
between SOVPOL and TAC, and SOVPOL and INTBUS are not in 
the expected direction, instead they are exactly opposite. 
When SOVPOL is 3 or 4 then TAC and INTBUS appear to be 
average or low, while TAC and INTBUS are high if SOVPOL is 
1 or 2. In relationship to SJV, Table 15 shows that if 
SOVPOL is 1 or 2 then a Western firm is less likely to 
engage in a Soviet joint venture and more likely to do so 
if SOVPOL is 3 or 4. However, the results of the bivariate 
analysis between TAC and SOVPOL (x2 = 191.391, p < .05. 
gamma = .693), and INTBUS and SOVPOL (x2 = 397.325, p <
.05, gamma = .876) are statistically significant but 
substantially insignificant based upon the expected 
direction of the relati< 1 Johnson and Joslyn
(1991:313) state that "b. ___  .relationship among a large
sample may attain statistical significance while a strong 
relationship withinf a small sample may not . . . chi-square 
values tell us tyJe probability that an observed 
relationship c^uld have occurred by chance."
The fourth independent variable in the Soviet joint 
venture model is SOP. SOP is the Western firm's perception 
of the impact of Soviet government policy on the Western 
firm's decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet joint 
venture. SOP is measured on a four point scale (l=greatly 
limits, 2=somewhat limits, 3=somewhat promotes, and 
4=greatly promotes) based upon Western firms' responses to 
Question 33 in both Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. Table 16 
shows the frequency distribution for SOP. The Soviet joint 
venture model suggests that SOP affects TAC, INTBUS, and 
SJV. If SOP equals 1 or 2 it is reasonable to expect that 
TAC and INTBUS will be high and that the odds are greater 
that the Western firm will not engage in a Soviet joint 
venture. The opposite is expected to occur if SOP equals 3 
or 4. Like SOVPOL, Tables 17 and 18 show that the 
relationships between the variables achieve statistical 
significance but the direction of the relationship is 
completely opposite from the expected relationships.
The fifth independent variable in the Soviet joint 
venture model is WESTPOL. WESTPOL is the Western firm's 
perception of the impact of Western governments' policies 
on the firm's decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet 
joint venture. WESTPOL is measured on a four point scale 
(l=greatly limits, 2=somewhat limits, 3=somewhat promotes, 
4=greatly promotes) based on Western firms' responses to
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TABLE 12: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR SOVPOL
CUMULATIVE CUMULATIVE 
SOVPOL____ FREOUENCY PERCENT____ FREOUENCY_____ PERCENT
1-Very
Stable 111 21.4 111 21.4
2-Somewhat
Stable 101 19.5 212 40.9
3-Somewhat
Unstable 144 27.8 356 68.7
4-Very
Unstable 162 31.3 513 100.0
TABLE 13: TRANSACTION COSTS BY SOVIET POLITICAL CLIMATE
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SOVPOL
TAC
Very
Stable
Somewhat
Stable
Somewhat
Unstable
Very
Unstable TOTAL
1-High 82
(15.8%)
46
(8.9%)
35
(6.8%)
7
(1.3%)
170
(32.8%)
2-Aver 29
(5.6%)
36
(7.0%)
47
(9.0%)
53
(10.2%)
165
(31.8%)
3-Low 0
(0%)
19 
(3.7%)
62
(12.0%)
102
(19.7%)
183
(35.4%)
TOTAL 111
(21.4%)
101
(20.0%)
144
(27.8%)
162
(31.2%)
518
(100%)
X 2 = 191.391 prob. = .000 gamma = .693
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TABLE 14: INTBUS BY SOVIET POLITICAL CLIMATE
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SOVPOL
INTBUS
Very
Stable
Somewhat
Stable
Somewhat
Unstable
Very
Unstable TOTAL
1-High 91
(17.6%)
34
(6.6%)
11
(2.1%)
7
(1.3%)
143
(27.3%)
2-Aver 20
(3.9%)
55
(10.6%)
91
(17.6%)
22
(4.2%)
188
(36.3%)
3-Low 0
(0%)
12
(2.3%)
42 
(8.1%)
133
(25.7%)
187 
(36.1%)
TOTAL 111
(21.5%)
101
(19.5%)
144
(27.8%)
162
(31.2%)
518
(100%)
X 2 = 397.325 prob. = .000 gamma = .854
TABLE 15: SOVIET JOINT* VENTURES BY SOVIET POLITICAL
CLIMATE
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SOVPOL
SJV
Very
Stable
Somewhat
Stable
Somewhat
Unstable
Very
Unstable TOTAL
0 (NO) 41 47 37 47 172
(7.9%) (9.1%) (7.1%) (9.1%) (33.2%)
1 (YES) 70 54 107 115 346
(13.5%) (10.4%) (20.7%) (22.2%) (66.8%)
TOTAL 111 101 144 162 518
(21.4%) (19.5%) (27.8%) (31.3%) (100%)
X2 = 13.735 prob. = .003 gamma = .162
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TABLE 16: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR SOP
SOP FREOUENCY PERCENT
CUMULATIVE
FREOUENCY
CUMULATIVE
PERCENT
1-Greatly
Limits 76 14.7 76 14.7
2-Somewhat 
Limits 166 32.0 242 46.7
3-Somewhat 
Promotes 140 27.0 382 73.7
4-Greatly 
Promotes 136 26.3 518 100.0
TABLE 17: TRANSACTION COSTS BY SOVIET GOVERNMENT POLICY
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SOP
TAC
Greatly
Limits
Somewhat
Limits
Somewhat
Promotes
Greatly
Promotes TOTAL
1-High 39
(7.5%)
63
(12.2%)
35
(6.8%)
33
(6.4%)
170
(32.9%)
2-Aver 11
(2.1%)
20
(3.9%)
56
(10.8%)
78
(15.0%)
165
(31.8%)
3-LOW 26
f5.0%)
83
(16.0%)
49 
(9.5%)
25
(4.8%)
183
(35.3%)
TOTAL 76
(14.6%)
166
(32.1%)
140
(27.1%)
136
(26.2%)
518
(100%)
X 2 = 94.424 prob. = .000 gamma =‘ -.012
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TABLE 18: INTBUS BY SOVIET GOVERNMENT POLICY
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SOP
INTBUS
Greatly
Limits
Somewhat
Limits
Somewhat
Promotes
Greatly
Promotes TOTAL
1-High 39
(7.5%)
43
(8.3%)
44
(8.5%)
17
(3.3%)
143
(27.6%)
2-Aver 11
(2.1%)
27
(5.2%)
54
(10.4%)
96
(18.5%)
188
(36.2%)
3-Low 26
(5.1%)
96
(18.5%)
42
(8.1%)
23
(4.5%)
187
(36.2%)
TOTAL 76
(14.7%)
166
(32.0%)
140
(27.0%)
136
(26.3%)
518
(100%)
X 2 = 137.327 prob. = .000 gamma = -.052
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Question 26 in Appendix 1 and Question 21 in Appendix 2. 
Table 19 shows the frequency distribution for WESTPOL. 
WESTPOL is expected to function in a similar manner to SOP, 
if WESTPOL equals 1 or 2 TAC and INTBUS will be high and a 
Western firm is unlikely to engage in a Soviet joint 
venture. Also like SOP, the opposite is expected if 
WESTPOL equals 3 or 4. Tables 20 and 21 show a strong 
bivariate relationship in the expected direction between 
TAC and WESTPOL (x2 = 448.75, P <_.05, gamma = .922) and 
INTBUS and WESTPOL (x2 = 513.79, P < .05, gamma = .935)..
The analysis of the survey data should explain what 
factors contribute to the creation and establishment of 
Western joint ventures in the Soviet Union. These results 
will be presented in the next section and will demonstrate 
that the theoretical conclusions of transaction-cost 
analysis can be supported by empirical evidence. The 
findings will be summarized in Chapter 5, followed by a 
brief analysis of the potential implications of the 
findings for Soviet foreign economic policy.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Table 22 presents the results of a multivariate 
logistic analysis of the following model and research 
hypothesis:
Model: SJV = a + b^TAC) + b2 (INTBUS) + b3 (SOVPOL)
+ b4(WESTPOL) + b5(SOP) + e
119
TABLE 19: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR WESTPOL
WESTPOL FREOUENCY PERCENT
CUMULATIVE
FREOUENCY
CUMULATIVE
PERCENT
1-Greatly
Limits 149 28.8 149 28.8
2-Somewhat 
Limits 170 32.8 319 61.6
3-Somewhat 
Promotes 113 21.8 432 83.4
4-Greatly 
Promotes 86 16.6 518 100.0
TABLE 20: TRANSACTION COSTS 
GOVERNMENT POLICY
BY WESTERN
TAC
Greatly
Limits
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF WESTPOL
Somewhat Somewhat Greatly 
Limits Promotes Promotes TOTAL
1-High 132 38 0 0 170
(25.5%) (7.3%) (0%) (0%) (32.8%)
2-Aver 17 101 36 11 165
(3.3%) (19.5%) (6.9%) (2.1%) (31.8%)
3-LOW 0 31 77 75 183
(0%) (5.9%) (15.0%) (14.5%) (35.4%)
TOTAL 149 170 113 86 518
(28.8%) (32.7%) (21.9%) (16.6%)(100%)
X 2 = 448.759 prob. = .000 gamma = .922
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TABLE 21: INTBUS BY WESTERN GOVERNMENT POLICY
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF WESTPOL
Greatly Somewhat Somewhat Greatly
INTBUS Limits Limits Promotes Promotes TOTAL
1-High 116 27 0 0 143
(22.4%) (5.2%) (0%) (0%) (27.6%)
2-Aver 33 125 19 11 188
(6.4%) (24.1%) (3.7%) (2.1%) (36.3%)
3-Low 0 18 94 75 187
(0%) (3.5%) (18.1%} (14.5%) f36.1%)
TOTAL 149 170 113 86 518
(28.8%) (32.8%) (21.8%) (16.6%) (100%)
x2 = 513 .793 prob. = .000 Gamma = .935
1 2 1
Research Hypothesis: The decision by Western firms to
engage in Soviet joint ventures is the direct or 
indirect result of the reduction of the transaction 
costs involved in Soviet-Western political economy.
Given the estimated coefficients in Table 22, the logistic
regression equation for the probability of a Western firms
engaging in a Soviet joint venture can be written:
SJV = .42 + .43(TAC) - .99(INTBUS)
- .03(SOVPOL) - .16(SOP) + .23(WESTPOL)
In multiple linear regression the interpretation of the
regression coefficients is straightforward. It tells the
researcher the amount of change in the dependent variable
for a one-unit change in the independent variable. The
logistic regression coefficient, however, is interpreted as
the change in the log odds associated with a one-unit
change in the independent variable (e.g., logit =
log[prob(event)/prob(no event)] - B0 + BjX1 + . . . + BpXp)
(Dobson 1990:112). A positive coefficient increases the
odds of an event for each level of an independent variable
while a negative coefficient decreases the odds (Walsh 1987).
The results of the logistic regression analysis
reveals that the overall model is statistically significant
(P < 0.001) with a chi-square of 23.51 with 5 degrees of
freedom. Walsh (1987) states that "the significant chi-
square value in the SAS program indicates the independent
variables have significant predictive value." The results
also reveal that the coefficients for TAC (.43, p = .07)
are marginally significant, very significant for INTBUS
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(-.99, p = .0003), while the coefficients for SOVPOL (-
.03), SOP (-.16), and WESTPOL (.23) are not. This suggests
a multicollinearity problem. Johnson, Johnson, and Buse
(1987:270-273) suggest two methods for solving the problem
of multicollinearity:
One possible way to resolve the problem is to obtain a 
new sample. This is easier said than done. In cross- 
sectional studies it may be possible to take a new 
sample from the population being studied but it is 
seldom practical to do so. Data collection by the 
interview method is an expensive undertaking and the 
cost of resampling is usually prohibitive . . .  A 
second possible means of coping with the problem of 
multicollinearity is to eliminate one or more of the 
variables . . . When there are several explanatory 
variables in the equation the problem is more 
difficult . . .  it may be that more than one variable 
is highly correlated with the same or a different 
subset of the remaining variables raising the question 
of which variables to delete. An even more serious 
potential problem is that deleting relevant variables 
can result in the introduction of bias into the 
estimates of the coefficients of the variables 
retained in the equation.
The Pearson correlation matrix for the variables is 
presented in Table 22. The sample correlations between TAC 
and INTBUS (.82), TAC and WESTPOL (.79), and TAC and SOVPOL 
(.60) are high. There are also substantial correlations 
between INTBUS and WESTPOL (.81), and INTBUS and SOVPOL 
(.74). Moreover, there is a strong correlation 
between SOVPOL and WESTPOL (.68). But "the presence of 
simple sample correlation in the sample does not 
necessarily mean that the multicollinearity problem exists" 
(Johnson, Johnson, and Buse 1987:271). Dobson (1990:112) 
argues that simple correlations among pairs of independent
TABLE 22: LOGISTIC REGRESSION - SOVIET JOINT VENUIRE M3DEL
ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES
Parameter Standard Wald HR >
Variable______________Estimate_________Error________ Chi-Sauare_______Chi-Sauare
Constant .42 .37 1.30 .26
TAC .43 .23 3.36 .07
INTBCJS -.99 .27 13.02 .0003
SOVPOL -.03 .13 .04 .84
SOP -.16 .10 2.50 .11
WESTPOL .23 .18 1.63 .20
Chi-Square for Overall Model: 23.50, P = .0003
Number of Cases: 518
Percent Predicted: 83.7
variables are suggestive but not conclusive. 
Multicollinearity can be measured by regressing each 
independent variable against all other independent 
variables. The resulting R2s measure the level of 
multicollinearity. Employing this method, 
multicollinearity is suggested in this study because four 
of the five independent variables have a large R2 (TAC=.67, 
INTBUS=.79, WESTPOL=.63, SOVPOL=.55, and SOP=.12).
However, it is important to note multicollinearity is not 
so much a problem, but rather causes a problem by 
increasing the estimates of the standard errors. This 
causes difficulty in obtaining stable or statistically 
significant estimates of the effects. With this caveat, 
Johnson, Johnson, and Buse (1987:275) state "there is no 
solution to the problem, short of never doing applied 
regression." As previously stated, removing any of the 
independent variables from the model can introduce bias 
into the estimates of the coefficients of the independent 
variables therefore all of the variables will be retained 
in the analysis that follows.
While it is certainly true that every model suffers 
from some specification error, the question of 
specification is more than simply a technical consideration 
in the analysis. Specification error can result in two 
ways. First, the model may be estimated with the wrong 
independent variables by omitting important variables,
TABLE 23: EEARSQN CORRELATION CDKt'FICLENIB
Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > R
SJV TAC INTBUS WESTPOL SOVPOL SOP
SJV 1.000 .06 .15 .05 .10 .09
0.0 .16 .00 .24 .02 .05
TAC .06 1 .000 .82 .79 .60 .005
.16 0.0 .00 .00 .00 .89
INTBUS .15 .82 1.000 .81 .74 -.13
.00 .00 0.0 .00 .00 .76
WESTPOL .05 .79 .81 1 .000 .68 -.18
.24 .00 .00 0.0 .00 .00
SOVPOL .10 .60 .74 .68 1.000 -.07
.02 .00 .00 .00 0.0 .09
SOP .09 .005 -.13 -.18 -.07 1 .000
.05 .89 .76 .00 .09 0.0
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including irrelevant variables, or both. A second form of 
misspecification occurs when we have the proper variables 
in the model but specify the functional form of the 
relationship improperly (Berry and Feldman 1985:18-22;
Achen 1982:51-58). There is no clear cut way of knowing 
that a substantively important variable has been excluded 
from an analysis, even after the fact (Berry and Feldman 
1985:25). However, the six conceptual components (the 
dependent variable and five independent variables) 
presented and operationalized in terms of the hypotheses, 
allow for a substantial degree of confidence in the 
substantive accuracy of the overall model. This confidence 
is founded not only in the conceptual clarity they 
introduce, but also the manner in which they provide a 
successful integration of the vast literature on Soviet- 
Western political economy, international political economy, 
and transaction-cost analysis. This confidence in the 
conceptualization of the model turns the specification 
question into a matter, literally, of best capturing the 
concepts. This study provides an excellent step in this 
direction.
The results presented in Table 22 can now be used to 
determine the odds of a Western firm engaging in a Soviet 
joint venture given its perception of the transaction costs 
that may be incurred (TAC), the level of business and 
strategic planning risks (INTBUS), the Soviet political
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climate (SOVPOL), the impact of Soviet government policy on
their decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet joint
venture (SOP), and the impact of Western government policy
on its joint venture decision (WESTPOL). This is
accomplished by substituting the parameter estimates for
each of the independent variables into the logistic
regression equation and evaluating various scenarios.
Walsh (1987) states:
This is very much like a prediction equation for 
ordinary least squares regression . . . Instead of 
calculating the best prediction or score by y, in 
logit we are calculating the best probability 
prediction.
The results of the logistic regression analysis of the 
Soviet joint venture model are summarized in Table 24. 
Analyzing the results for TAC demonstrate that the 
probability of a Western firm engaging in a Soviet joint 
venture decreases as the level of TAC increases, thus the 
research hypothesis for the study cannot be rejected.
As previously stated positive coefficients mean the 
odds of an event occurring are increased, while the odds of 
an event occurring are reduced by negative coefficients. 
This holds for the Soviet joint venture model if the odds 
of a Western firm engaging in a Soviet joint venture are 
calculated from all of the possible scenarios of the 
independent variables. In order to verify the logistic 
coefficients a multivariate regression analysis is
T&BEE 24: A TEANSACETCN-OOKr ANAIXSIS OF SOVIET 
JOINT VENTURES WITH THE WEST
SJV TAC INTBUS SOVPOL SOP WESTPOL ODDS
TAOl -1.2 .43 -2.07 -.08 -.42 .52 .31:1
TAC=2 -.77 .86 -2.07 -.08 -.42 .52 .47:1
TAO=3 -.34 1.29 -2.07 -.08 -.42 .52 .72:1
INTBQS^ l .32 .87 -.99 -.08 -.42 .52 1.38:1
INTEUS=2 -.67 .87 -1.98 -.08 -.42 .52 .52:1
INTBUS=3 -1.66 .87 -2.97 -.08 -.42 .52 .19:1
SOVFOIx=l -.71 .87 -2.07 -.03 -.42 .52 .49:1
S0VP0L=2 -.74 .87 -2.07 -.06 -.42 .52 .48:1
S0VP0L=3 -.77 .87 -2.07 -.09 -.42 .52 .46:1
S0VP0L=4 -.80 .87 -2.07 -.12 -.42 .52 .44:1
S0P=1 -.50 .87 -2.07 -.08 -.16 .52 .61:1
S0P=2 -.66 .87 -2.07 -.08 -.32 .52 .51:1
S0P=3 -.82 .87 -2.07 -.08 -.48 .52 .44:1
S0P=4 -.98 .87 -2.07 -.08 -.64 .52 .38:1
WESTP0L=1 -1.05 .87 -2.07 -.08 -.42 .23 .35:1
WESTP0L=2 -.82 .87 -2.07 -.08 -.42 .46 .44:1
WESTF0Ir=3 -.59 .87 -2.07 -.08 -.42 .69 .55:1
WESTP0L=4 -.36 .87 -2.07 -.08 -.42 .92 .70:1
Constant=.42
Note: These estimates were obtained by examining various levels of each
independent variable and substituting the mean for all of the other 
independent variables.24 128
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presented in Appendix 3, this analysis further supports the 
coefficients and findings of the logistic analysis of the 
Soviet joint venture model.
The logistic model with its five conceptual components 
is further strengthened by examining the two intervening 
conceptual components in the model: TAC and INTBUS. The 
model indicates that the Western firm's perception of the 
level of transaction costs (TAC) that may be incurred by 
engaging in a Soviet joint venture is directly affected by 
WESTPOL, SOP, and SOVPOL. Table 25 presents a multivariate 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression analysis of the 
impact of WESTPOL, SOP, and SOVPOL on TAC. The estimated 
coefficients predict that all three variables will affect 
the Western firm's perception of the level of transaction 
costs that may be incurred by engaging in a Soviet joint 
venture (SJV). All of the independent variables (WESTPOL, 
SOVPOL, and SOP) are significant at the .05 significance 
level. In addition, the R2 for the analysis is .66, which 
means that the model accounts for approximately 66 percent 
of the variance, leaving only 34 percent of the variance 
unexplained by these factors.
The Western firm's perception of the level of business 
and strategic planning risks involved in engaging or not 
engaging in a Soviet joint venture (INTBUS) may account for 
some of the unexplained variance found in the multivariate 
regression analysis of TAC. The Soviet joint venture model
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TABUE 25: OLS COEFFICIENTS FOR TAC
Dependent Variable: TAC
Independent
Variables_____________ Coefficient_____ S .E._____T-Score
CONSTANT .16 .09 1.85
WESTPOL .59 .03 21.03*
SOP .12 .02 5.76*
SOVPOL .08 .03 3.14*
R2 . 66
Adjusted R2 . 66
Number of Cases 518
F-Value 331.10**
*P< Significant at .05 level
**p< Significant at .05 level
131
suggests that as a dependent variable INTBUS is directly 
and indirectly affected by the independent variables TAC, 
WESTPOL, SOP, and SOVPOL. A multivariate OLS regression 
analysis of INTBUS is present in Table 26. All of the 
independent variables are significant and the R2 for the 
model is .79. Thus, the model accounts for approximately 
79 percent of the variance leaving only 21 percent of the 
variance unexplained by these factors.
The importance of the direct and indirect influence of 
WESTPOL, SOVPOL, and SOP on TAC and INTBUS is illustrated 
by the multivariate analyses presented in Tables 25 and 26. 
Therefore, if WESTPOL, SOVPOL, and SOP all have such an 
influence on TAC and INTBUS they should remain in the 
logistic regression analysis of the Soviet joint venture 
model. As previously stated, if either WESTPOL, SOVPOL, or 
SOP is eliminated from the logistic regression model it is 
possible that the coefficient estimates would be biased.
In summary, the data are favorable toward all of the 
conceptual components developed above in the Soviet joint 
venture model. The importance of the Western firm’s 
perception of (1) the level of transaction costs that may 
be incurred by engaging in a Soviet joint venture, and (2) 
the level of business and strategic planning of a Soviet 
joint venture are among the major findings. Thus, the 
analysis helps to explain some of the factors that 
contribute to Soviet joint ventures with the West. The
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TABLE 26: OLS COEFFICIENTS FOR INTBUS
Dependent Variable: INTBUS
Independent
Variable Coefficient S.E. T-Scor<
CONSTANT .092 .06 1.44
TAC .39 .04 11.97*
WESTPOL .22 .03 7.66*
SOP .05 .02 2.86*
SOVPOL .22 .02 11.16*
R2 .79
Adjusted R2 .79
Number of Cases 518
F-Value 498.26**
*P< Significant at .05 level
**P< Significant at .05 level
theoretical conclusions of Chapter 3 are thereby supported 
by the empirical evidence presented here. The IPE 
literature is currently dominated by theories designed 
to explain political and economic relations among states 
with well-established, functioning free market economies, a 
characteristic not yet found in the Soviet Union.
Therefore, transaction-cost analysis provides an additional 
theoretical framework that can be integrated into the 
existing IPE literature in order to help explain political 
and economic relations among states with different types of 
political and economic systems (e.g., the United States and 
its free market economy, and the Soviet Union and its 
centrally planned economy). Questions remain, however, 
concerning the implications of the analysis for Soviet 
foreign economic policy and Soviet joint ventures with the 
West in light of the recent political personnel and policy 
changes in the Soviet Union. The concluding chapter will 
demonstrate that the Soviet joint venture model and 
transaction-cost analysis are viable social scientific 
tools in researching Soviet foreign economic policy.
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was threefold (1) to explain 
the factors that contribute to the establishment of Soviet 
joint ventures with the West, (2) to integrate a relatively 
new theoretical framework within the existing IPE theories 
to bear directly on the problem of Soviet-Western political 
economy, and (3) to speculate about the effect of Soviet 
joint ventures with the West on Soviet-Western economic and 
political relations. In the previous chapters, goals one 
and two were somewhat achieved. Transaction-cost analysis' 
emphasis on institutions, contracts, economic conditions, 
political conditions, rules, enforcement, and opportunism 
provides an analytical framework that can help explain the 
role of these variables in governing and facilitating 
Soviet-Western political economy. Eggertsson (1990:15) 
states that there are six activities related to political 
and economic exchanges between states, firms, or 
individuals that give rise to transaction costs:
1. The search for information about the distribution 
of price and quality of commodities and labor inputs, 
and the search for potential buyers and sellers and 
for relevant information about their behavior and 
circumstances.
2. The bargaining that is needed to find the true 
position of buyers and sellers when prices are 
endogenous.
3. The making of contracts.
4. The monitoring of contractual partners to see 
whether they abide by the terms of the contract.
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5. The enforcement of a contract and the collection 
of damages when partners fail to observe their 
contractual relations.
6. The protection of property rights against third- 
party encroachment - for example, protection against 
pirates or even against the government in the case of 
illegitimate trade.
The world of the new economics of organization (NEO)
is one where uncertainty and opportunism exist, thereby
reguiring complex institutional structures and arrangements
for the (1) the establishment of economic and political
relations, and (2) the reduction or elimination of
transaction costs. The NEO environment provides a very
precise description of the international political economy
(IPE) and of Soviet-Western political economy. In Power
and Interdependence. Keohane and Nye (1988:253-254) state:
From the foreign policy standpoint, the problem facing 
individual governments is how to benefit from 
international exchange while maintaining as much 
autonomy as possible. From the perspective of the 
international system, the problem is how to generate 
and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of 
cooperation in the face of competing efforts by 
governments, and nongovernmental actors, to manipulate 
the system for their own benefit.
The NEO environment and the IPE in a world of complex
interdependence are very similar in nature, therefore,
transaction-cost analysis provides an added dimension to
the study of IPE, Soviet-Western political economy, and
Soviet foreign economic policy by providing a framework for
studying political and economic relations among states in
the international system with different and similar
political and economic structures.
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Stephen Krasner suggests that transaction-cost
analysis is not logically inconsistent with the traditional
power-oriented research program of international politics.
Krasner (1991:362) states:
The most important issues for a power-oriented 
analysis is the distribution of capabilities and 
benefits. Charles Perrow, for instance, argues there 
is always a struggle within an institution because 
control of the institution can bring with it a variety 
of rewards including security, power, and survival.
For a power-oriented research program, power is 
exercised not to facilitate cooperation but to secure 
a more favorable distribution of benefits. And 
analysis seeks to explain outcomes in terms of 
interests and relative capabilities rather than in 
terms of institutions designed to promote Pareto 
optimality.
Transaction-cost analysis' focus on institutions is also 
designed to explain outcomes in terms of interests and 
relative capabilities. It is precisely the interests or 
capabilities of states, firms, or individuals that may 
increase or reduce the cost of transacting between economic 
and political agents.
The empirical analysis of the survey data offers some 
support for the theoretical conclusions of NEO and 
transaction-cost analysis. The empirical results found 
that the decision by a Western firm to engage or not engage 
in a joint venture may be directly or indirectly influenced 
by that firm's perception of the level of transaction costs 
that could be incurred in such a venture. The data also 
indicate that the perceived level of transaction costs is 
influenced by the Western firm's perception of Western
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government policy, Soviet government policy, and the Soviet 
political climate. If the perceived level of transaction 
costs is high, the data suggest that a Western firm is less 
likely to engage in a Soviet joint venture. On the other 
hand, if the perceived level of transaction costs is 
average or low, the data suggest that a Western firm is 
more likely to engage in a Soviet joint venture.
The third objective of this study was to speculate 
about the effect of Soviet joint ventures with the West on 
Soviet-Western economic and political relations to 
determine if joint ventures would significantly effect 
Soviet-Western political economy. As stated in Chapter 1, 
when this study began the Soviet Union under the leadership 
of President Mikhail Gorbachev appeared to be moving toward 
a free market economy and complete integration of the 
Soviet Union into the established international political 
economy. However, since the summer of 1990 numerous events 
have occurred in the Soviet Union that appear to have 
shifted the direction of Gorbachev's program of 
perestroika, thus resulting in questions about the 
applicability of the Soviet joint venture model developed 
and tested in this study. However, in the area of Soviet- 
Western political economy the Soviet Union continues to 
move toward greater economic reform and liberalization as 
demonstrated by recent (1) legislation of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet, (2) legislation of the most economically important
138
republics in the Soviet Union (e.g., the Baltics and 
Russia), and (3) Presidential Decrees issued by Gorbachev. 
The result, noted earlier, has been a 42 percent increase 
in Soviet joint ventures with the West between September 1, 
1990 and March 1, 1991.
Cooperation in the liberalization of Soviet-Western 
political economy must continue if the Soviet Union wants 
to shake its permanently developing country (PDC) image and 
become a major player in the IPE. This requires that the 
Soviet government, and the governments of the various 
republics, make the Soviet Union even more attractive to 
Western investors by further reducing the level of 
transaction costs and the level of business and strategic 
planning risks involved in doing business in the Soviet 
Union. Because in a world of complex interdependence high 
levels of TAC and INTBUS may reduce cooperation and 
increase the potential for opportunism.
The theoretical discussion of NEO and transaction 
costs in Chapter 3 and the empirical analysis of the Soviet 
joint venture model demonstrate that this study, its 
theoretical assumptions, and the model are still 
appropriate research tools even if the Soviet Union is 
moving from policies of liberalization to Communist Party 
hardline policies of retrenchment. The Soviet Union, like 
the NEO world, is a world where, for example, "individuals 
are only bounded rationally, legal enforcement of
agreements is costly and imperfect, and opportunistic acts 
cannot be ruled out" (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990:239). 
This makes cooperation difficult, "even when all parties 
are acting in good faith, and it therefore creates a demand 
for norms to enhance predictability and political and 
economic institutions to support exchange and other forms 
of cooperation" (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990:240). 
Uncertainty can also be increased if actors are engaging in 
opportunistic behavior, strategic behavior that is designed 
to deliberately conceal an actor's preferences or actions 
in order to achieve gains that improves its position while 
threatening the welfare and utility of other actors 
(Hodgson 1988:37-40). Obviously, the Soviet Union in 1991 
fits the criteria of NEO and transaction-cost analysis.
The Soviet joint venture model and its theoretical 
assumptions are adaptable to other areas of Soviet foreign 
economic relations with the West, such as the decision to 
engage or not engage in trade with the Soviet Union. This 
study suggests that many Western foreign economic decisions 
are based upon the variables of (1) Western government 
policy, (2) Soviet government policy. (3) Soviet political 
climate, (4) the level of transaction costs, and (5) the 
business and strategic planning risks. The theoretical 
arguments demonstrate that these factors may be some of the 
most crucial in a Western firm's decisionmaking process 
regarding doing business in the Soviet Union.
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Transaction-cost analysis appears to be a more
rigorous and precise research tool for the study of Soviet-
Western political economy as the Soviet Union continues to
move toward a free market economy and becomes more
integrated into the international political economy. In
War and Change in World Politics. Robert Gilpin presents an
argument which gives further credence to a transaction-cost
analysis of Soviet joint ventures with the West when the
current political situation in the Soviet Union within the
context of the IPE is taken into consideration. Gilpin
(1981:231-233) states:
A further reason for the rise and spread of a market 
economy and for its impact was a decrease in 
transaction costs, especially the costs of defining 
and enforcing property rights. . . In the new 
international environment created by the advent of 
sustained economic growth and a world market economy, 
the tendency of states to expand as their power grew 
underwent a profound transformation. Whereas in the 
premodern world, expansion principally took the form 
of territorial expansion, political expansion and 
economic expansion have tended to characterize growing 
states in the modern world. The primary objectives of 
increasing numbers of states have been to extend their 
political influence over other states and to increase 
their dominance over the world market economy.
Through specialization and international trade an 
efficient state could gain more than through 
territorial expansion and conquest. The expanded 
market and the diversity of available resources made 
possible by trade were spurs to growth of wealth and 
power of those states best able to take advantage of 
the change in world conditions. For these states, 
trade proved to be more profitable than imperial 
tribute.
The Soviet Union now appears to be attempting to 
follow a path of market reform in order to increase its 
wealth and power which would allow it to maintain its
superpower status in the international system. Thus, 
transaction-cost analysis appears to offer greater 
empirical verisimilitude than any other existing IPE model 
for the study of Soviet-Western political economy. 
Transaction-cost analysis provides the basis for not only 
examining the amount of overall trade and business between 
the Soviet Union and the West in joint ventures and other 
business arrangements, but can also examine and explain the 
nature and impact of those relationships on the 
international political economy.
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APPENDIX 1
QUESTIONNAIRE: WESTERN FIRMS INVOLVED IN JOINT VENTURES
WITH THE SOVIET UNION
1. How would you describe your firm's attitude toward 
doing business with the Soviet Union?
65% 1. Very willing to do business with the Soviet
Union.
35% 2. Have minor reservation about doing business
with the Soviet Union, but anxious to 
explore possibilities with the Soviet Union 
to become established in Soviet market.
0% 3. Willing to explore, but have serious
reservations about doing business with the 
Soviet Union.
0% 4. Little interest in doing business with the
Soviet Union.
0% 5. No interest in doing business with the
Soviet Union.
100% Total N=346
2. Does your firm conduct business in the Soviet Union?
100% Yes 0 No
N=346
3. Has your firm entered into a joint venture agreement 
with a firm in the Soviet Union?
100% Yes 0 No
N=346
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What type of international business activity, other 
than joint ventures, does your firm primarily conduct 
in the USSR?
22% 1. International trade.
75% 2. Licensing agreements.
3% 3. Plant and equipment transfers.
0% 4. Subcontracting.
0% 5. Co-production.
0% 6. Other (please specify). No Responses.
100% Total N=346
I would like for your firm to rate the desirability of 
the Soviet Union as a foreign customer or business 
partner on a scale of 0 to 10. For example, if you 
rate the desirability of the Soviet Union as a foreign 
customer or business partner as average, give it a 
rating of 5. If you rate the desirability of the 
Soviet Union as a foreign customer or business partner 
as above average, give it a rating of 6 to 10. If you 
rate the Soviet Union as a foreign customer or 
business partner as below average, give it a rating 
from 0 to 4.
Average Rating 6.5
In order to compare the desirability of the Soviet 
Union as a foreign customer or business partner,please 
rate the desirability of the following countries as a 
foreign customer or business partner based on the same
scale used in Question 6.
3.6 Brazil 6.6 Israel 4.8 South Africa
8.2 Canada 5.9 Italy 6.4 South Korea
4.3 Egypt 8.5 Japan 5.7 Spain
CO•f'- France 5.1 Mexico 5.1 Sweden
7.9 Britain 6.3 PRC 8.3 United States
3.4 Hungary 5.2 Poland 4.6 Venezuela
4.7 India 5.8 Saudi Arabia8.1 West Germany
Scores Reflect Average Ratings for Survey
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7. What is the name of your firm's joint venture in the 
Soviet Union?
THIS INFORMATION WILL BE USED TO AVOID DUPLICATION. 
SPECIFIC IDENTIFYING INFORMATION IS CONFIDENTIAL 
AND WILL NOT BE MADE PUBLIC.
8. How is the percentage share of the joint venture 
distributed?
Your firm 46.9%
Soviet firm 51.3% AVERAGE
Other firms 1.8%
9. Name the home base country of other firms involved in 
your joint venture agreement in the Soviet Union?
10. Is your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union fully 
operational?
59% Yes 41% No
N=346
11. If your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union is 
not fully operational, what is its current stage of 
operation?
34% 1. Planning and development.
29% 2. Construction.
12% 3. On Hold.
25% 4. Other (please specify). Soviet partner
contribution._________________________
100% Total N=346
1 52
12. If your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union is on 
hold, which of the following factors have contributed 
most significantly to the delay?
12% 1. Soviet legal barriers.
6% 2. Soviet financial and economic barriers.
18% 3. Managerial/personnel problems.
6% 4. Soviet infrastructure/bureaucratic problems.
0% 5. Lack of agreement on goals
18% 6. Repatriation of profit problems.
0% 7. Western government policies.
40% 8. Other (please specify). Soviet partner
contribution.
100% Total N=17
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13. How important was each of the following factors in 
your firm's decision to engage in a joint venture 
agreement in the Soviet Union?
Very Somewhat Not Not
Factor Important Important Important Sure
Soviet Political Climate 42% 53% 5% 0%
Marketing 18% 63% 19% 0%
Research and Development 81% 12% 7% 0%
Home Government Policies 20% 56% 24% 0%
Trade Barriers 11% 72% 17% 0%
Capital Investment 28% 40% 32% 0%
Labor 5% 27% 68% 0%
Production/Technology 34% 57% 9% 0%
Information 12% 28% 60% 0%
World Economy 26% 23% 25% 26%
Soviet Monopsony Power 1% 3% 5% 91%
Soviet Government Policies 34% 32% 34% 0%
Repatriation of Profits 75% 25% 0% 0%
Soviet Infrastructure 16% 38% 40% 6%
Soviet Financial Barriers 23% 28% 35% 14%
Lack of Agreement on Goals 31% 33% 25% 11%
Managerial Problems 47% 30% 23% 0%
Personnel Problems 41% 34% 25% 0%
Soviet Legal Barriers 25% 32% 43% 0%
Governance and Maintenance 
of Soviet Relationship
18% 22% 66% 0%
Other: No Responses 
(Please Specify)
N=346 For Each Factor
0% 0% 0% 0%
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14. Does your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union 
require a marketing effort?
100% Yes 0% No
N=346
If you answered yes to Question 14 please answer Question
15. If you answered no to Question 14 please go to 
Question 16.
15. How much marketing effort is required to sell products 
or services in the Soviet Union?
61% 1. Much more than average foreign customer.
21% 2. Initial sales require more marketing effort,
but repeat sales do not.
0% 3. Not sure.
10% 4. Level of required marketing is about the same.
8% 5. Less expensive than for most foreign
customers.
100% Total N=346
16. How reliable are the Soviets in complying with 
contract agreements?
22% 1. Very reliable.
46% 2. Meets agreements, but exploits loopholes.
0% 3. Uncertain.
32% 4. Sometimes does not meet agreement.
0% 5. Never meets agreements.
100% Total N=346
17.
18.
19.
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In what area of industry will your firm's joint 
venture activity in the Soviet Union primarily occur?
5%
8%
24!
1. Chemical
2. Energy (oil, 
gas, other)
3. Computer/
4. Food
5. Service 
(hotels, 
tourism, etc.)
22%
15‘
8
9,
100^
Machinery/Heavy
Industry
Consumer Products
Agriculture
Medical
2% 10. Other (Please
Specify):
Telecommunications
Total N=346
In which Soviet Republic is your firm's joint venture 
located?
82% 1. Russia 0% 9. Azerbaijan
5% 2. Estonia 0% 10. Molvavia
3% 3. Ukraine 4% 11. Latvia
2% 4. Georgia 0% 12. Kazakhstan
3% 5. Lithuania 0% 13. Kirghizia
1% 6. Belorussia 0% 14. Turkmenistan
0% 7. Armenia 0% 15. Tazdzhikistan
0% 8. Uzbekistan 100% Total N=346
To what market is the final products of your firm's
joint venture in the Soviet Union targeted?
28% 1. Soviet domestic market.
12% 2. Home domestic market.
60% 3. World market.
0% 4. Other (please specify). No Resoonses.
100% Total N=346
1 5 6
20. What is the estimated initial capital investment for 
your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union?
1% 1. Over $30 million
2% 2. $20 - 29 million
34% 3. $10 - 19 million
41% 4. $ 1 - 9  million
17% 5. $500,000 - 1 million
5% 6. $100,000 - 500,000
1% 7. Under $100,000
100% 8. Total N=346
21. What is the estimated annual operational costs for 
your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union?
1% 1. Over $30 million
1% 2. $20 - 29 million
32% 3. $10 - 19 million
28% 4. $ 1 - 9  million
36% 5. $500,000 - 1 million
2% 6. $100,000 - 500,000
0% 7. Under $100,000
100% 8. Total N=346
2 2 .
23.
24.
NOTE
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What is the estimated annual revenue for 
your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union?
0% 1. Over $30 million
4% 2. $20 - 29 million
33% 3. $10 - 19 million
38% 4. $ 1 - 9  million
25% 5. $500,000 - 1 million
0% 6. $100,000 - 500,000
0% 7. Under $100,000
100% 8. Total N=346
How does your firm plan to repatriate profits from 
its joint venture in the Soviet Union?
24% 1. Barter arrangements.
43% 2. Trading goods from the joint venture on the
international market.
15% 3. Hard currency auctions.
18% 4. Consortia.
0% 5. Other (please specify). No responses.
100% Total N=346
What type of technology is required for your firm's
joint ventures in the Soviet Union?
78% 1. General purpose or standardized technology.
22% 2. Transaction-specific technology (see note).
100% Total N=346
Transaction-specific technology is technology that 
is idiosyncratic to a particular business 
relationship, the loss of this relationship would 
result in significant excess capacity and other 
associated losses.
25.
26.
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Of the following Western government policies, which 
has had or will have the most adverse effect on your 
firm's joint venture project in the Soviet Union?
32% 1. Trade barriers (e.g., export and import
controls).
21% 2. Controls and legal restrictions on extending
credit to the Soviet Union.
27% 3. Failure to give the Soviet Union most
favored nation (MFN) status.
20% 4. Multilateral restrictions agreed upon by
GATT and the OECD (e.g., anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws).
0% 5. Other (please specify). No responses.
100% Total N=346
How would your firm describe the impact of Western 
governments' policy on your firm's decision to engage 
in a Soviet joint venture?
20% 1. Greatly limits.
31% 2. Somewhat limits.
27% 3. Somewhat promotes.
22% 4. Greatly promotes.
100% Total N=346
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27. The costs of information, including the supplying and 
the learning of the terms on which transactions are to 
be carried out (the rules of the game), are frequently 
associated with market exchange. Contracts and laws 
are the formal means by which firms and governments 
attempt to limit the strategic use of information and 
thereby reducing the costs of information. How would 
your firm describe the Soviet Joint Venture Law and 
your finn's joint venture agreement in limiting the 
strategic use of information by all parties involved, 
thereby reducing the costs of information?
54% 1. Greatly limits and reduces the strategic use
and costs of information.
41% 2. Somewhat limits and reduces the strategic
use and costs of information.
0% 3. Uncertain.
5% 4. Somewhat ambiguous and provides minimal
opportunity for the strategic use of 
information.
0% 5. Very ambiguous and substantially increases
the opportunity for the strategic use of 
information.
100% Total N=346
28. What mechanism is provided for in your firm's joint 
venture agreement in the Soviet Union to ensure the 
proper governance and maintenance of the joint 
venture?
34% 1. Arbitration.
24% 2. Direct negotiations between all parties of
the joint venture agreement.
7% 3. Adjudication.
35% 4. Abrogation of the joint venture agreement if 
any of the contracting parties renege.
0% 5. Other (please specify). No responses.
100% Total N=346
29.
30.
31.
32.
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How do you think the mechanism selected in Question 28 
will effect the costs of maintaining and governing 
your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union, and the 
potential for opportunism and defection by all parties 
involved in the agreement?
58% 1. Greatly reduces the costs and the potential
for opportunism and defection.
40% 2. Somewhat reduces the costs and the potential
for opportunism and defection.
0% 3. Uncertain.
2% 4. Somewhat increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
0% 5. Greatly increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
100% Total N=346
In length of years, what is the average contract term 
of your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union?
3% 1. 10 years or more.
53% 2. 5 - 9  years.
44% 3. 1 - 4  years.
0% 4. Less than a year.
100% Total N=346
What were the biggest surprises or unanticipated costs 
of your firm's joint venture project in the Soviet 
Union?
Level of cooperation and willingness to work exhibited
by Soviet co-workers._______________________________
If your firm had the opportunity to do it all again, 
what would your firm do differently as it negotiated 
and engaged in a joint venture project in the Soviet 
Union?
Negotiate for 100 percent ownership of joint venture.
33.
34.
35.
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How would your firm describe the impact of Soviet 
government policy on your firm's decision to engage in 
a joint venture?
9% 1. Greatly limits.
25% 2. Somewhat limits.
31% 3. Somewhat promotes.
35% 4. Greatly promotes.
100% Total N=346
How would your firm describe the current political 
climate in the Soviet Union?
19% 1. Very stable.
22% 2. Somewhat stable.
27% 3. Somewhat unstable.
32% 4. Very unstable.
100% Total N=346
Of the following events, which one would have to occur 
and negatively alter the Soviet political climate in 
order for your firm to end all business relations with 
the Soviet Union?
5% 1. Secession of the Soviet Republics.
15% 2. The ouster of Mikhail Gorbachev as
President.
80% 3. Civil War in the Soviet Union.
0% 4. Economic depression.
0% 5. Other (please specify). No responses.
100% Total N=346
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36. Please provide any comments about doing business with 
the Soviet Union or this survey you think might be 
helpful:
No responses.______________________________________
37. General Information:
Name and title of person answering survey;
Name_____________________  Title_________________
Company Address:
Phone Number:____________
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE WITH THIS SURVEY. ALL 
INFORMATION AND SPECIFIC IDENTIFYING INFORMATION IS 
CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL NOT BE MADE PUBLIC.
APPENDIX 2
QUESTIONNAIRE: WESTERN FIRMS NOT INVOLVED IN SOVIET JOINT
VENTURES BUT DOING BUSINESS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
How would you describe your firm's attitude toward 
doing business with the Soviet Union?
71% 1. Very willing to do business with
the Soviet Union.
29% 2. Have minor reservation about doing
business with the Soviet Union, but 
anxious to explore possibilities with 
the Soviet Union to become established 
in Soviet market.
0% 3. Willing to explore, but have serious
reservations about doing business with the 
Soviet Union.
0% 4. Little interest in doing business with the
Soviet Union.
0% 5. No interest in doing business with the
Soviet Union.
100% Total N=172
Does your firm conduct business in the Soviet Union?
100% Yes 0 No
N=172
Has your firm entered into a joint venture agreement 
with a firm in the Soviet Union?
 0% Yes 100% No
N=172
Is your firm currently in the process of negotiating 
a joint venture agreement in the Soviet Union?
15% Yes 85% No
N=172
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5. What type of international business activity, other 
than joint ventures, does your firm primarily conduct 
in the USSR?
25% 1 . International trade.
53% 2. Licensing agreements.
8% 3. Plant and equipment transfers.
10% 4. Subcontracting.
4% 5. Co-production.
0% 6 . Other (please specify). No Responses.
100% Total N=172
6. I would like for your firm to rate the desirability of 
the Soviet Union as a foreign customer or business 
partner on a scale of 0 to 10. For example, if you 
rate the desirability of the Soviet Union as a foreign 
customer or business partner as average, give it a 
rating of 5. If you rate the desirability of the 
Soviet Union as a foreign customer or business partner 
as above average, give it a rating of 6 to 10. If you 
rate the Soviet Union as a foreign customer or 
business partner as below average, give it a rating 
from 0 to 4.
Average Rating 6.1
7. In order to compare the desirability of the Soviet 
Union as a foreign customer or business partner, 
please rate the desirability of the following 
countries as a foreign customer or business partner 
based on the same scale used in Question 6.
2.9 Brazil 6.3 Israel 4.3 South Africa
8.1 Canada 6.2 Italy 6.3 South Korea
4.0 Egypt 8.3 Japan 5.9 Spain
CO• France 5.2 Mexico 5.0 Sweden
r—1 •
CO Britain 5.9 PRC 8.6 United States
3.2 Hungary 5.2 Poland 5.1 Venezuela
4.9 India 5.6 Saudi ArabiaS.4 West Germany
Scores Reflect Average Ratings for Survey
1 6 5
8. How important was each of the following factors in
your firm's decision not to engage in a joint venture 
agreement in the Soviet Union?
Very Somewhat Not Not
Factor Important Important Important Sure
Soviet Political Climate 94% 6% 0% 0%
Marketing 21% 31% 48% 0%
Research and Development 55% 36% 9% 0%
Home Government Policies 24% 61% 15% 0%
Trade Barriers 10% 55% 35% 0%
Capital Investment 73% 25% 2% 0%
Labor 12% 37% 51% 0%
Production/Technology 76% 15% 9% 0%
Information 80% 18% 2% 0%
World Economy 19% 25% 40% 16%
Soviet Monopsony Power 2% 1% 5% 92%
Soviet Government Policies 50% 40% 10% 0%
Repatriation of Profits 57% 39% 4% 0%
Soviet Infrastructure 73% 25% 2% 0%
Soviet Financial Barriers 21% 60% 19% 0%
Lack of Agreement on Goals 53% 37% 10% 0%
Managerial Problems 15% 39% 37% 9%
Personnel Problems 20% 46% 22% 12%
Soviet Legal Barriers 63% 35% 2% 0%
Governance and Maintenance 
of Soviet Relationship
83% 16% 1% 0%
Other: No Responses 
(Please Specify)
N=172 For Each Factor
0% 0% 0% 0%
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9. Does your firm's business activity with the Soviet 
Union require a marketing effort?
52% Yes 48% No
N=172
If you answered yet to Question 9 please answer Question
10. If you answered no to Question 9 please go to Question
11.
10. How much marketing effort is required to sell products 
or services in the Soviet Union?
48% 1. Much more than average foreign customer.
36% 2. Initial sales require more marketing effort,
but repeat sales do not.
0% 3. Not sure.
10% 4. Level of required marketing is about the same.
6% 5. Less expensive than for most foreign
customers.
100% Total N=89
11. How reliable are the Soviets in complying with 
contract agreements?
21% 1. Very reliable.
34% 2. Meets agreements, but exploits loopholes.
0% 3. Uncertain.
36% 4. Sometimes does not meet agreement.
9% 5. Never meets agreements.
100% Total N=172
1 2 .
13.
14.
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In what area of industry does your firm primarily 
conduct business in the Soviet Union?
22% 1. Chemical 
18% 2.
8?
0‘
0%
 Energy (oil, 
gas, other)
3. Computer/
4. Food
5. Service 
(hotels, 
tourism, etc.)
35% 6. Machinery/Heavy
Industry
4% 7. Consumer Products
11% 8. Agriculture
2% 9. Medical
0% 10. Other (Please
Specify):
100? Total N=172
In which 
conduct
Soviet Republic 
business?
is does your firm primarily
79% 1. Russia 0% 9. Azerbaijan
5% 2. Estonia 0% 10. Molvavia
4% 3. Ukraine 2% 11. Latvia
3% 4. Georgia 0% 12. Kazakhstan
4% 5. Lithuania 0% 13. Kirghizia
2% 6. Belorussia 0% 14. Turkmenistan
1% 7. Armenia 0% 15. Tazdzhikistan
0% 8. Uzbekistan 100% Total N=172
To what market is the final products of your firm's 
business activity in the Soviet Union targeted?
56? 1. Soviet domestic market. 
15% 2. Home domestic market. 
29% 3. World market.
0% 4. Other (please specify). No Responses,
100% Total N=172
15.
16.
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What is the estimated initial capital investment for 
your firm's business activity in the Soviet Union?
1% 1. Over $30 million
2% 2. $20 - 29 million
31% 3. $10 - 19 million
22% 4. $ 1 - 9  million
16% 5. $500,000 - 1 million
23% 6. $100,000 - 500,000
5% 7. Under $100,000
100% 8. Total N=172
What
your
is the estimated annual o] 
firm's business activity :
1% 1. Over $30 million
4% 2. $20 - 29 million
9% 3. $10 - 19 million
49% 4. $ 1 - 9  million
19% 5. $500,000 - 1 million
16% 6. $100,000 - 500,000
2% 7. Under $100,000
100% 8. Total N=172
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17. What is the estimated annual revenue for
your firm's business activity in the Soviet Union?
0% 1. Over $30 million
3% 2. $20 - 29 million
39% 3. $10 - 19 million
30% 4. $ 1 - 9  million
23% 5. $500,000 - 1 million
4% 6. $100,000 - 500,000
0% 7. Under $100,000
100% 8. Total N=172
18. How does your firm plan to repatriate profits from 
its business activity in the Soviet Union?
72% l. Barter arrangements.
28% 2. Trading goods from the joint venture on the
international market.
0% 3. Hard currency auctions.
0% 4. Consortia.
0% 5. Other (please specify). No responses.
100% Total N=172
19. What type of technology is required for your firm's
business activity in the Soviet Union?
67% 1. General purpose or standardized technology.
33% 2. Transaction-specific technology (see note).
100% Total N=172
NOTE: Transaction-specific technology is technology that
is idiosyncratic to a particular business 
relationship, the loss of this relationship would 
result in significant excess capacity and other 
associated losses.
2 0 .
21.
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Of the following Western government policies, which 
has had or will have the most adverse effect on your 
firm's business activity in the Soviet Union?
25% 1. Trade barriers (e.g., export and import
controls).
13% 2. Controls and legal restrictions on extending
credit to the Soviet Union.
22% 3. Failure to give the Soviet Union most
favored nation (MFN) status.
40% 4. Multilateral restrictions agreed upon by
GATT and the OECD (e.g., anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws).
0% 5. Other (please specify). No responses.
100% Total N=172
How would your firm describe the impact of Western 
governments' policy on your firm's decision not to 
engage in a Soviet joint venture?
45% 1. Greatly limits.
37% 2. Somewhat limits.
12% 3. Somewhat promotes.
6% 4. Greatly promotes.
100% Total N=172
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22. The costs of information, including the supplying and 
the learning of the terms on which transactions are to 
be carried out (the rules of the game), are frequently 
associated with market exchange. Contracts and laws 
are the formal means by which firms and governments 
attempt to limit the strategic use of information and 
thereby reducing the costs of information. How would 
your firm describe the contractual agreement(s) with its 
Soviet business partner(s) in limiting the 
strategic use of information by all parties involved, 
thereby reducing the costs of information?
0% 1. Greatly limits and reduces the strategic use
and costs of information.
30% 2. Somewhat limits and reduces the strategic
use and costs of information.
0% 3. Uncertain.
55% 4. Somewhat ambiguous and provides minimal
opportunity for the strategic use of 
information.
15% 5. Very ambiguous and substantially increases
the opportunity for the strategic use of 
information.
100% Total N=172
23. What mechanism is provided for in your firm's
contractual agreement(s) with its Soviet business 
partners to ensure the proper governance and maintenance 
of the business relationship?
0% 1. Arbitration.
18% 2. Direct negotiations between all parties of
the joint venture agreement.
0% 3. Adjudication.
82% 4. Abrogation of the joint venture agreement if
any of the contracting parties renege.
0% 5. Other (please specify). No responses.
100% Total N=172
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24. How do you think the mechanism selected in Question 23 
will effect the costs of maintaining and governing 
your firm's business activities in the Soviet Union, and 
the potential for opportunism and defection by all 
parties involved in the agreement?
0% 1. Greatly reduces the costs and the potential
for opportunism and defection.
38% 2. Somewhat reduces the costs and the potential
for opportunism and defection.
0% 3. Uncertain.
50% 4. Somewhat increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
12% 5. Greatly increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
100% Total N=172
25. In length of years, what is the average contract term 
of your firm's business activities in the Soviet Union?
10% 1. 10 years or more.
50% 2. 5 - 9  years.
38% 3. 1 - 4  years.
2% 4. Less than a year.
26. What were the biggest surprises or unanticipated costs 
of your firm's business activities in the Soviet 
Union?
Level of cooperation and willingness to work exhibited 
bv Soviet co-workers._______________________________
27. If your firm had the opportunity to do it all again, 
what would your firm do differently as it negotiated 
and engaged in business activities in the Soviet 
Union?
Seek greater control over business activity._________
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28.
29.
What aspect of Soviet policy would have to change to
make your firm reconsider its decision not to engage
in a joint venture agreement in the Soviet Union?
30% 1. Convertible ruble.
25% 2. Implementation of market economy in USSR.
11% 3. Increased economic efficiency and improvement
in the quality of Soviet products and 
services.
2% 4. Improved business hospitality in the Soviet
Union (e.g., better hotels, services, 
entertainment).
6% 5. More political reform.
4% 6. More economic reform.
22% 7. Other (please specify). 100 Percent____
Ownership________________________________
100% Total N=172
Which of the following Western government policies 
had the most impact on your firm's decision not to 
engage in a joint venture project in the Soviet Union?
35% 1. Trade barriers (e.g., export and import
controls).
15% 2. Controls and legal restrictions on extending 
credit to the Soviet Union.
21% 3. Failure to give the Soviet Union most
favored nation (MFN) status.
29% 4. Multilateral restrictions agreed upon by
GATT and the OECD (e.g., anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty laws).
0% 5. Other (please specify). No responses.
100% Total N=172
30.
31.
32.
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Which of the following Western government policies 
would most definitely have to change to make your firm 
reconsider its decision not to engage in a joint venture 
project in the Soviet Union?
35% 1. Trade barriers (e.g., export and import
controls).
15% 2. Controls and legal restrictions on extending
credit to the Soviet Union.
21% 3. Failure to give the Soviet Union most
favored nation (MFN) status.
29% 4. Multilateral restrictions agreed upon by
GATT and the OECD (e.g., anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty laws).
0% 5. Other (please specify). No responses.
100% Total N=172
What factor do you think would contribute significantly 
to the Soviet Union becoming a major actor in the world 
economy?
34% 1. Convertible ruble.
46% 2. Implementation of market economy in USSR.
13% 3. Increased economic efficiency and improvement
in the quality of Soviet products and 
services.
7% 4. Stable political climate.
0% 5. Other (please specify) No responses._____
100% Total N=172
How would your firm describe the current political 
climate in the Soviet Union?
26% 1. Very stable.
14% 2. Somewhat stable.
30% 3. Somewhat unstable.
30% 4. Very unstable.
100% Total N=172
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33. How would your firm describe the impact of Soviet
government policy on your firm's decision not to engage 
in a joint venture?
27% 1. Greatly limits.
45% 2. Somewhat limits.
19% 3 . Somewhat promotes.
9% 4. Greatly promotes.
100% Total N=172
34. Of the following events, which one would have to occur 
and negatively alter the Soviet political climate in 
order for your firm to end all business relations with 
the Soviet Union?
4% 1. Secession of the Soviet Republics.
16% 2. The ouster of Mikhail Gorbachev as
President.
80% 3. Civil War in the Soviet Union.
0% 4. Economic depression.
0% 5. Other (please specify). No responses.
100% Total N=172
35. Please provide any comments about doing business with 
the Soviet Union or this survey you think might be 
helpful:
No responses._______________________________________
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36. General Information:
Name and title of person answering survey:
Name_____________________  Title________
Company Address:
Phone Number:____________
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE WITH THIS SURVEY. 
INFORMATION AND SPECIFIC IDENTIFYING INFORMATION 
CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL NOT BE MADE PUBLIC.
ALL
IS
APPENDIX 3
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION OF SOVIET JOINT VENTURE MODEL
Dependent Variable:
Independent
Variables
SJV
Coefficient S.E. T-Score
CONSTANT .41 .08 5.063
TAC .08 .05 1.755*
INTBUS -.21 .06 -3.633**
WESTPOL .05 .04 1.256
SOP -.04 .02 -1.594
SOVPOL -.01 .03 -0.200
R2 .04
Adjusted R2 .04
F-Value 4.756**
Number of Cases 518
*P< Significant at .10 level
**P< Significant at .05 level
In order to assess the positive and negative signs of 
the coefficients in the logisitic analysis of the Soviet 
joint venture model a multivariate regression analysis was 
run. The results were similar with the coefficients for 
TAC and WESTPOL being positive, while the coefficients for 
INTBUS, SOVPOL, and SOP were negative. The overall model 
was statistically significant with a F-value of 4.756 
(prob. = .0003). In addition, like the logistic analysis, 
TAC and INTBUS were the only significant variables in the 
model. However, the key fact is that the Soviet joint 
venture model does help explain cooperation in the 
liberalization of Soviet-Western political economy.
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